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The goal of this dissertation is to advance our understanding of perceptual 
decisions.  A perceptual decision is a decision that is based on sensory evidence.  For 
example, a monkey must choose whether to eat a food item based on sensory information 
such as its color, texture or odor.  Previous research has identified regions of the brain 
involved in the encoding of sensory information as well as areas involved in transforming 
encoded representations of stimuli into signals useful for forming decisions about those 
stimuli.  Researchers carried out much of this work by painstakingly observing the firing 
of single neurons or small groups of neurons while a subject performs a task, and used 
this information to propose and evaluate models of the decision process.  However, 
previous studies have also shown that sensory stimuli are encoded in a distributed fashion 
across populations of neurons rather than in individual or small groups of neurons.  Thus 
it is likely that populations of neurons, rather than individual neurons, are responsible for 
the formation of a decision.  Here I directly address the question of how decisions are 
formed through the collective activity of populations of cortical neurons.  I used voltage-
sensitive dye imaging, a technique that allowed me to simultaneously monitor millions of 
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neurons in sensory cortex, while primates performed a simple yet challenging binary 
decision task.  I also used psychophysical techniques and computational modeling to 
address fundamental questions about the nature of perceptual decisions.  Here I provide 
new evidence that choice-related neural activity is distributed across a broad population 
of neurons, and that most of the decision-related neural activity occurs as early as 
primary sensory cortex.  I propose a physiological and computational mechanism for the 
subject’s decision process in our task, and demonstrate that this process is likely sub-
optimal due to intrinsic uncertainty about sensory stimuli.  Overall, I conclude that in our 
task, perceptual decisions are likely to be limited primarily by the quality of evidence that 
resides in populations of neurons in sensory cortex, secondarily by sub-optimal decoding 
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Chapter 1:  General Introduction 
 
Most animals are continuously faced with a challenging problem:  how to use 
information from the environment to guide behavior.  A monkey in the wild, for example, 
must decide where to forage for food, which foods to eat, and which mate to choose.  
Each of these complex decisions requires the animal to gather information from the 
environment, evaluate how this information bears on its goals, and take action. 
A long-term goal of systems neuroscience is to understand the relationship 
between perception, decision-making, and behavior.  How are physical stimuli 
represented (encoded) in the brain?  Which brain areas are responsible for representing 
which kinds of information?  Once the physical attributes of a stimulus have been 
encoded in a sensory area of the brain, how are they interpreted by other brain regions?  
And how will this information guide behavior? 
 In this dissertation I address two broad questions which further our understanding 
of these processes.  First, when an organism is engaged in a task that requires the use of 
sensory information, where in the brain are the signals that relate to decisions and how 
are these signals distributed across neurons?  Much work has been done to elucidate how 
sensory information is encoded in early sensory areas of the brain, and modern 
techniques in neuroscience have allowed researchers to ask whether this information 
could be the basis on which animals gather evidence in favor of, or against, taking a 
particular action.  Here I ask whether such decision-related information can be found as 
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early as the primary visual cortex (V1), the first cortical area in which visual information 
is encoded in the primate brain. 
Second, I ask how the information encoded in this early sensory area is read out, 
or decoded, by subsequent areas of the brain in order to guide behavior.  A small visual 
stimulus such as the Gabor target used in this dissertation can activate millions of neurons 
in V1.  How then does the monkey combine these signals to form a decision about this 
stimulus?  Two well-known properties of sensory cortical encoding offer clues as to how 
subsequent brain areas might use these encoded signals.  First, individual nerve cells in 
the primate cortex tend to respond preferentially to specific low-level features of a visual 
stimulus, such as the color or size of an object.  It is reasonable to suggest that the brain 
might selectively monitor those cells that respond to stimulus features that are relevant to 
the organism’s task at hand.  For example, when determining which fruits will be the 
most delicious, the brain might monitor cells sensitive to the fruit’s color, which often 
indicates ripeness.  These cells’ responses should be better suited to this task than cells 
that encode, for example, motion across the visual field.  Secondly, some cells that 
encode the feature of interest do so with higher fidelity than others, and are therefore 
more useful in making an estimate of this physical attribute.  Thus we might expect the 
brain to preferentially monitor those cells that carry more reliable information.  Are only 
the most informative neurons used?  Or does the monkey combine information from 
many or all of those neurons, including those that are less reliable?  Here I address this 
question by looking at entire populations of neurons in the primary visual cortex while a 
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monkey performs a simple task, and use the monkey’s decisions to assess how these 
distributed signals are combined to form a simple decision. 
This dissertation is composed of four chapters.  Chapter 1 is a general 
introduction to the study of perceptual decision-making, emphasizing the theoretical 
questions and experimental paradigms that have led up to the studies presented here, and 
is geared towards the general reader interested in perceptual decisions.  Chapters 2 and 3 
are formatted like stand-alone research papers, and describe the experiments and 
computational modeling that represents the bulk of my doctoral work.  Chapter 4 
describes my general conclusions, and revisits the key questions introduced in Chapter 1 
in light of our experimental and computational results. 
In this dissertation I variously use “I” and “we” to indicate work that was done by 
myself or as a part of a collaborative group.  While I carried out the VSDI experiments 
and performed the analyses described here, all of this work was guided by a collaboration 
including my advisor, Eyal Seidemann, and colleagues.  Three colleagues’ assistance 
warrants additional acknowledgment because their contributions over multiple years 
directly impacted the results presented here.  I credit Jonathan Pillow for his 
formalization and derivation of the maximum likelihood estimator used in the modeling 
of Chapter 2.  Yuzhi Chen provided frequent Matlab and programming assistance, 
including the application of the optimal decoder to the VSDI and simulated data 
presented in Chapters 2 and 3.  Finally, Tihomir Cakic tirelessly provided technical 




1.1 A framework 
A useful framework for addressing questions about perceptual decision-making 
identifies three distinct stages in the formation of a simple binary perceptual decision 
(Fig. 1.1).  First, information about physical stimulus enters the nervous system via the 
sensory periphery and is encoded in an early sensory area.  For example, the image of an 
object is transduced by the retina and represented by a pattern of neural activity in the 
primary visual cortex.  Second, this information is decoded.  Visual information 
represented by a large number of cells in the primary visual cortex is combined in a way 
that is useful to the animal and relevant to the task, and this combined (decoded) 
information may be represented in a downstream motor area, such as the frontal eye 
fields or pre-motor cortex; alternatively, decision-related signals could occur in another 
downstream area and serve to gate a motor response.  Third, the combined information is 
evaluated against a decision criterion to form the basis of a motor response.  For example, 
in a task that requires the animal to make an eye movement based on sensory 




Figure 1.1.  General framework for the formation of a binary perceptual decision.  
Sensory stimuli are encoded in sensory cortex (‘Sensory Encoding’); the sensory 
representation is decoded by a later brain area to obtain signals useful for performing a 
task (‘Decoding’); a single value (‘Decision Variable’) is compared against a criterion to 




structures, such as the frontal eye fields, superior colliculus, dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex, or cerebellar vermis.  These three conceptual stages (encoding, decoding, and 
decision) are internal to the animal’s nervous system, and form the critical chain that 
connects stimulus to behavior. 
 
1.2 Visual system 
Here I study the neural correlates of these stages within the context of the primate 
visual system.  The primate visual system is an excellent model system in the study of 
perceptual decisions.  First, vision is central to primates:  there are at least 30 distinct 
visual areas in the human brain.  Second, the primate visual system has been well studied.  
Because the fundamental response properties of visual cortical neurons have been 
extensively characterized, existing work in the visual system provides a firm basis for 
studying higher order relationships, such as relationships among brain areas and the 
relationship between populations of neurons and behavior.  Finally, the visual system in 
the monkey shares features in common with that of humans, making the results 
potentially applicable to our species as well.  Many human visual areas have homologous 
structures in the monkey.  Within such visual areas, many cell types, response properties, 
and functional connectivity are common to both species. 
 Nevertheless, this work may be highly relevant to other sensory systems as well.  
Much progress has been made in identifying and characterizing brain areas that serve 
auditory and somatosensory functions (in traditions beginning with, e.g., Kiang et al., 
1965; Mountcastle, 1957; Siebert, 1965; Talbot et al., 1968), and some of the questions 
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addressed here have been asked within the context of these other systems.  However, the 
work presented here represents one of the first studies to address these questions in a 
behaving organism with measurements across entire populations of visual cortical 
neurons with excellent spatial and temporal resolution, and indeed represents one of the 
first such studies in any sensory system.  The results presented here could provide new 
insight into how neuronal signals are used to form simple decisions, and suggest similar 
experiments that can be performed in other systems.  Future researchers may wish to ask 
whether the findings presented here represent principles that underlie sensory systems 
generally. 
 
1.3 Signal Detection Theory 
Signal detection theory (SDT) is a framework in which to study decision-making.  
It is widely used in the research mentioned in this introduction, and is also employed in 
the studies presented in this dissertation.  It assumes that decisions about sensory stimuli 
are based on evidence contained in a neural signal corrupted by noise (Green and Swets, 
1966).  To illustrate, suppose that a subject must detect the presence of a visual stimulus 
such as a flash of light (e.g., Barlow et al., 1971; Hecht et al., 1942).  On some trials, a 
flash will be presented and on other trials it will not.  The subject’s task is to respond 
with “Yes” or “No” to indicate whether he detected the flash.  Assume also that there are 
neurons within the brain that encode the intensity of light, responding with a large 
number of action potentials during intense flashes and fewer action potentials (or none) 
during weak flashes (e.g., Barlow et al., 1971).  In the absence of variability, the subject’s 
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task is easy:  respond “Yes” when the neuron fires an action potential, and response “No” 
when it does not.  But because of the intrinsic variability of many neurons (e.g., Arieli et 
al., 1996; De Valois et al., 1967; Tolhurst et al., 1983), the relationship between flash 
intensity and the physiological response is only true on average – usually trials with a 
flash will produce a stronger response (more action potentials) than trials without a flash.  
Sometimes however, due to the stochastic firing of neurons, a strong flash of light will 
produce a weaker response than expected, and vice versa.  The activity of a sensory 
neuron in this task is best represented as a pair of stochastic distributions.  If the flash 
stimulus is weak, the mean of the distribution belonging to flash trials will be only 
slightly greater than the mean of the distribution belonging to no-flash trials.  If the noise 
is sufficiently large relative to the difference between the means of the two distributions, 
then the two distributions will overlap, making it impossible for the observer using these 
signals to perform the task with 100% accuracy.  Instead, the observer must make an 
informed guess.  Typically within this framework, the observer applies a criterion 
somewhere between the means of the two distributions.  If the physiological response to a 
single trial exceeds the criterion, the subject reports “Yes”, otherwise he reports “No”.  
The subject’s choice behavior and accuracy depends on the difference between the means 
of the distributions and their variability, as well as the placement of the criterion.  
Intuitively, a subject can perform most accurately when the means of the distributions are 
widely separated relative to their variability. 
 Studies based on signal detection theory in the context of binary decisions, such 
as the example described above, have at their core four categories of behavioral 
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responses.  Because there are two possible stimulus conditions (e.g., flash or no-flash) 
and two possible behavioral responses (“Yes” or “No”), there are four possible outcomes 
on each trial.  On trials in which a flash was presented, if the observer reports “Yes” the 
trial is said to be a ‘Hit’, whereas if the observer reports “No” it is said to be a ‘Miss’.  
On trials that did not contain a flash, if the observer reports “Yes” it is classified as a 
‘False Alarm’ (FA), whereas if he reports “No” it is said to be a ‘Correct Rejection’ (CR). 
In this dissertation, I study the relationship between a monkey’s behavioral 
responses in a visual detection task and the simultaneously measured physiological 
responses in V1.  The visual stimulus I used in these experiments is a Gabor patch (a sine 
wave grating within a 2-dimensional Gaussian envelope) because this stimulus is well 
suited to drive responses in V1 cells.  I am interested in the co-variation not only between 
neural responses and the presence or absence of a stimulus, but also between neural 
responses and behavior, irrespective of this stimulus-response relationship.  Thus to 
ensure that any observed co-variation between neuronal activity and choice are not due 
simply to differences in the stimulus, it is critical that these measurements be made on 
repeated trials of identical stimuli, and that the monkey makes a mixture of “Yes” and 
“No” responses for each stimulus condition.  This experimental constraint means that the 
subject must make errors, and therefore the task must be difficult.  To control task 
difficulty in the experiments presented here, I manipulated the contrast of the Gabor 
stimuli presented to the subject.  Visual contrast is defined here as the difference between 
the maximum luminance of a visual stimulus minus its minimum luminance, divided by 
their sum.  A Gabor stimulus whose sine wave grating has large amplitude will contain 
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regions of very high and very low luminance, observable as light and dark regions, 
making it easily detectable against a grey computer screen.  A low contrast Gabor, on the 
other hand, contains a low amplitude sine wave and thus has only a subtle difference 
between its highest and lowest luminance, making it difficult for an observer to detect 
against a grey computer screen.  Thus in these studies, to drive V1 cells effectively while 
simultaneously keeping the task difficult, I used Gabor targets at low contrast. 
 
1.4 Experimental strategy 
To understand the neural basis of perceptual decision-making, the ultimate goals 
are to discover (1) which brain areas and neurons are responsible for the steps outlined 
above:  encoding, decoding, and decision; and (2) how the process unfolds.  To implicate 
a given brain area or group of neurons as critical components in this processing chain, 
certain criteria must be met (Parker and Newsome, 1998).  The researcher aims to:  (1) 
identify neuronal signals which co-vary with attributes of sensory stimuli, (2) 
demonstrate that the signals are sufficient to perform a task that requires decisions about 
these stimuli, (3) demonstrate that the task-relevant signals co-vary with the subject’s 
choices in the task, and finally (4) demonstrate that the signals contained in these neurons 
are necessary to perform the task.  Here I review progress in establishing these criteria in 






1.5 Finding stimulus-related signals in the brain 
To implicate a set of neurons in the processing of sensory stimuli and formation 
of a decision, researchers must establish that those neurons are related to the stimulus, 
and hence relevant to a task requiring the subject to make decisions about that stimulus.  
Sensory neurons must change their firing patterns in response to various stimuli that are 
presented to the organism (Parker and Newsome, 1998).  An enormous body of work has 
identified stimulus-related response properties in many brain areas.  In the visual system, 
the groundbreaking work of Hubel and Wiesel identified neurons in cat (e.g., Hubel and 
Wiesel, 1962) and monkey (e.g., Hubel and Wiesel, 1968) primary visual cortex that 
responded selectively to visual features such as retinal position, line orientation, ocular 
dominance, color, and direction of motion.  They defined classes of cells in V1 that 
differed in their receptive field properties, labeling them as “simple”, “complex”, or 
“hyper-complex” (Hubel and Wiesel, 1968), and described the functional organization of 
these cells into groups that share a preferred stimulus orientation, eye of origin, and 
responsiveness to motion.  Subsequently, the response properties of cells in many areas 
of the visual system have been discovered and described, linking areas such as MT to 
motion perception (e.g., Dubner and Zeki, 1971; Maunsell and Van Essen, 1983), MST to 
optic flow and heading direction (e.g., Bradley et al., 1996; Saito et al., 1986; Tanaka et 
al., 1989), FEF and LIP to eye movement planning and decision variables (e.g., Bruce 
and Goldberg, 1985; Bruce et al., 1985; Gnadt and Andersen, 1988; Huk and Shadlen, 
2005; Platt and Glimcher, 1997; Roitman and Shadlen, 2002), and IT to the recognition 
of complex objects such as hands (Gross et al., 1972) and faces (Desimone et al., 1984; 
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Tsao et al., 2006).  Subsequent studies described higher order relationships among these 
areas such as the functional specialization of dorsal and ventral processing streams to 
serve object recognition and spatial localization functions, respectively (Mishkin and 
Ungerleider, 1982).  Similarly groundbreaking studies have identified the basic response 
properties of early sensory cells in the auditory (e.g., Kiang et al., 1965; Siebert, 1965) 
and somatosensory (e.g., Mountcastle, 1957; Talbot et al., 1968) systems. 
These pioneering studies showed that the firing patterns of sensory nerve cells 
respond to specific stimuli, and to specific attributes of a given stimulus, making them 
excellent candidates for the neurons that underlie perceptual decisions about those 
stimuli. 
 
1.6 Are the signals sufficient to perform the task? 
In a landmark study, Newsome et al. (1989) carried out experiments to compare 
the behavioral performance of a subject engaged in a binary decision task with that of a 
hypothetical observer who performs the same task, but whose decisions are based on the 
activity of individual sensory neurons collected from the same subject.  The researchers 
measured neural activity in area MT of a Rhesus macaque monkey while the subject 
performed a visual motion direction discrimination task (Newsome et al., 1989).  The 
subject viewed a motion stimulus consisting of a field of moving dots, some of which 
moved at random, and some of which moved coherently in one direction.  The 
researchers controlled the difficulty of the task by varying the percentage of dots that 
moved coherently.  When a large fraction of the dots moved in one direction, the monkey 
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was able to report the direction of motion with almost 100% accuracy.  However as the 
researchers reduced the percentage of dots moving coherently, the monkey’s performance 
dropped correspondingly, until the monkey performed at chance (50% accuracy) when 
the randomly moving dots had no coherent motion in one direction or another.  The 
researchers used these results to construct a psychometric curve describing the accuracy 
of the monkey as a function of coherence.  The curve began at chance on zero coherence 
trials, increased sigmoidally over intermediate coherences, and saturated at 100% for 
easy (high coherence) trials. 
The researchers then used the simultaneously collected neuronal responses to 
construct a neurometric curve, which describes the ability of a single neuron to determine 
the direction of motion.  Neurons in MT are known to change their response properties as 
a function of both the direction and speed of a moving stimulus, and each neuron 
responds best to a particular combination of these attributes.  In addition, MT neurons 
tuned to these stimulus attributes increase their firing rates with higher motion coherence.  
While these neurons increase their firing rates on average, there is nonetheless variability 
in the spike rate measured at a particular coherence level, and spike counts collected 
across trials form stochastic distributions.  The researchers collected these distributions 
by recording the firing rates of each neuron as it responded to motion in its preferred 
direction, and also in the opposite direction, at the various motion coherence levels.  
When motion coherence was high, the two distributions of spike counts (those collected 
on ‘preferred’ direction trials and those collected on ‘non-preferred’ (or ‘null’) direction 
trials) were widely separated, making it easy for a researcher with access to these 
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distributions to distinguish which direction of motion was presented.  When motion 
coherence was low, however, the distributions tended to overlap considerably, making it 
difficult to discriminate direction of motion.  The researchers employed a method based 
on signal detection theory (reviewed above) that allowed them to compute the 
performance of a hypothetical observer with access to these distributions in determining 
the direction of motion, and summarized the accuracy of the observer as a function of 
motion coherence in what they called the neurometric function.  Here too, the accuracy of 
this hypothetical observer increased with increasing motion coherence. 
By quantitatively comparing the psychometric and neurometric functions, the 
researchers found that the shape and position of these curves were similar.  Indeed, when 
they compared the threshold value for each curve (coherence level at which the 
psychometric or neurometric function crosses 82% correct) they found that on average, 
the thresholds from the hypothetical observer were the same, or even lower than, those of 
the monkey.  This finding showed, surprisingly, that on average the activity of a single 
neuron was sufficient to account for the sensitivity of the subject, and in some cases 
carried more information than was needed to account for the subject’s accuracy 
(Newsome et al., 1989). 
Results from subsequent studies have been mixed.  On one hand, many additional 
studies have found that behavioral sensitivity can be accounted for by the responses of 
single cells or small groups of cells when measured in appropriate tasks, in brain areas 
including V1 (Chen et al., 2006; Geisler and Albrecht, 1997; Nienborg and Cumming, 
2006; Palmer et al., 2007; Parker and Hawken, 1985; Skottun et al., 1987; Tolhurst et al., 
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1983), V2 (Nienborg and Cumming, 2006), MT (Britten et al., 1996; Britten et al., 1992; 
Croner and Albright, 1999; Uka and DeAngelis, 2003), MST (Celebrini and Newsome, 
1994), LIP (Law and Gold, 2008), S1 (de Lafuente and Romo, 2005; Hernandez et al., 
2002), S2 (Romo et al., 2003), somatosensory afferents (Mountcastle et al., 1972; Talbot 
et al., 1968), and LGN (De Valois et al., 1967).  On the other hand, some studies 
employing similar experimental paradigms demonstrated, instead, that behavior 
performance could not be explained by the sensitivities of single neurons or small groups 
of neurons (e.g., Cohen and Newsome, 2009; Liu and Newsome, 2005; Osborne et al., 
2004; Prince et al., 2000; Purushothaman and Bradley, 2005). 
Two important criticisms of the Newsome et al. (1989) study concern task timing 
and neuron selection.  In this study the researchers used a fixed, 2-s time interval over 
which to collect and average neuronal activity.  This interval is now generally regarded as 
an unrealistically long duration, since monkey inter-saccadic fixation intervals typically 
last only a few hundred milliseconds.  Critics point out that by integrating too long, the 
researchers overestimated the information available to the monkey during the task, and 
hence biased the result in favor of the neuron.  This concern was substantiated when the 
study was repeated in a reaction-time version of the same task (Cohen and Newsome, 
2009), in which the researchers found that the neuronal sensitivity did not exceed the 
behavioral sensitivity. 
A second criticism of this and similar studies can be made on the basis of neuron 
selection.  Researchers often match stimulus features to those preferred by the cell under 
study.  For example, researchers studying MT advance an electrode into the area and 
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monitor fluctuations in neural activity that correlates with attributes of motion stimuli.  
Once a cell is found and isolated, researchers often adjust the speed and direction of 
motion of the stimulus display to match the neuron’s preferred attributes.  Thus in studies 
comparing the sensitivity of a neuron with that of the subject, the neurons start with an 
advantage because they are effectively selected to show sensitivity to the stimuli being 
tested.  While this practice does not invalidate a conclusion that neurons capable of 
matching or exceeding behavioral sensitivity exist, the criticism nevertheless highlights a 
natural question about how the brain uses information from sensory neurons:  if the brain 
were to use the signals from the most sensitive neuron, it too must find that neuron.  
How?  The topic of neuron selection is discussed in more detail below in the section on 
the lower envelope principle. 
In some of the studies mentioned above, while the activity of a single neuron was 
not sufficient to account for the subject’s behavior, the combined activity of two or more 
neurons could account for the psychophysical sensitivity.  For example, Romo et al., 
(2003) measured activity of single neurons in primary somatosensory cortex (S1) while a 
monkey performed a vibrotactile discrimination task, and found that while individual 
neurons were not sufficiently sensitive to account for the behavior, subtracting the 
responses from two neurons with a common noise source provided enough information to 
match the subject’s accuracy (Romo et al., 2003).  The topic of combining information 
across multiple neurons to improve the quality of the stimulus-related information is 
central to this dissertation, and is introduced in more detail below in the section on 
readout and pooling and is pursued empirically in Chapter 3. 
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A third criticism of many of these earlier studies is that the comparison between 
neuronal and behavioral performance was made using data sets that were not collected 
simultaneously, or on the same trials, or in many cases even in the same animal or 
species.  For example, Hecht and colleagues (1942) quantified the absolute number of 
photons needed for human observers to detect a flash of light, and Barlow and colleagues 
(1971) measured neuronal detection thresholds in cat retinal ganglion cells (RGCs) and 
compared it to the human data of Hecht from 30 years previous. 
In light of this third criticism, and despite concerns related to task timing, the 
Newsome et al. (1989) study represents a new and powerful experimental paradigm:  the 
simultaneous measurement of perceptually relevant neurons while an awake subject 
performs a simple task.  In this paradigm, researchers could measure both neural activity 
and behavior, and they devised ways to evaluate the performance of the signals against 
the performance of the animal in directly comparable ways.  The simultaneous 
measurement approach also enabled researchers to address the next key question in 
implicating a neuron in the decision processing chain:  whether the firing of that neuron 
predicts choice. 
 
1.7 Are the signals correlated with the subject’s individual choices? 
To determine whether the activity of a neuron contributes to a perceptual 
decision, it is helpful to determine first whether these signals co-vary with the subject’s 
choices.  To answer this question, it is critical to design an experimental paradigm, such 
as in the Newsome et al. (1989) study, in which neural activity and behavior are 
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measured simultaneously.  Because of the technical difficulties imposed by these 
experiments, there have been comparatively few studies that measured neural activity and 
behavior at the same time.  Many such simultaneous comparisons are carried out in 
awake, behaving monkeys since monkeys can be trained to perform a wide variety of 
tasks. 
Britten and colleagues measured the activity of cells in MT while a monkey 
performed the same motion direction discrimination task described above (Britten et al., 
1996).  This time, they turned their attention to the relationship between the variable 
neuronal responses and the monkey’s varying behavioral choices.  They reasoned that if 
the monkey uses cells in MT to perform the task, the activity of those cells should 
correlate with the monkey’s choices.  Importantly, since the physiology and the behavior 
were collected simultaneously, the researchers could investigate this relationship on a 
trial-to-trial basis.  For example, if a monkey uses the responses of an MT neuron that 
prefers motion in the upward direction to detect upward motion, when this cell fires more 
strongly the monkey should be more likely to judge the direction of motion as upwards.  
Stronger motion coherences in the upward direction indeed lead to stronger responses in 
a direction-selective cell preferring upward motion, as reviewed above.  However, 
stronger motion coherence trials are also easier for the monkey to discriminate, making it 
more likely that the subject would choose the upward direction on these easier trials.  
Thus it is possible that any observed relationship between firing rate and choice could be 
due trivially to changes in motion coherence.  For this reason, the researchers restricted 
their analysis to only those trials in which the net motion coherence was zero.  This 
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ensured that any neuronal-choice co-variation is not due to the particular stimulus 
presented on a given trial.  Nevertheless, the firing rate of an MT cell is inherently 
variable and across many presentations of zero coherence trials the firing rate of that 
neuron is best described with a stochastic distribution. 
 To quantify the relationship between neuronal firing and choice, they developed a 
metric, which they termed choice probability (CP), and which quantifies the ability of a 
neuron’s responses to predict choices on a trial-to-trial basis.  Choice probability was 
defined as the area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve applied to two 
distributions of neural responses belonging to the two possible choices a subject made 
during the same stimulus condition.  The area under the curve ranges from 0.5 (when the 
two distributions are completely overlapping) to unity (when the distributions are non-
overlapping).  Choice probability represents the accuracy with which an experimenter 
who observes this neuron can classify trials as belonging to the correct response 
distribution. 
Importantly, the choice probability measure defined by the ROC analysis has a 
number of advantages over other measures of discriminability (Parker and Newsome, 
1998).  First, it summarizes the ability of an observer to discriminate between 
distributions with a single number.  In comparison, measures that rely the mean 
difference between two distributions also require a measure of their variability, the 
usefulness of which depends in turn on the shape of the distributions.  Second, the ROC 
value can be compared directly with measures of psychophysical sensitivity, such as the 
subject’s percent correct.  Third, the ROC is a non-parametric measure, not relying on the 
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shape of the underlying distributions.  In contrast, a discriminability measure such as d’, 
defined as the difference in the means of the two distributions divided by their pooled 
standard deviation, depends on the assumption that the two distributions are normally 
distributed, whereas spike rates are usually modeled as a Poisson process.  In this case, 
the distributions can deviate significantly from normality, particularly when the spike 
rates are low.  In Chapter 2, I consider additional properties of the choice probability 
measure, and introduce a new metric for quantifying the relationship between neural 
activity and choice that has some advantages over choice probability. 
The critical finding of the Britten et al. (1996) study was that the choice 
probability values were significantly greater than the chance value of 0.5.  Their average 
choice probability value for MT neurons in the direction discrimination task was 0.555.  
This means that an observer of the spike rates of MT neurons tuned to the direction of 
motion presented could correctly guess the monkey’s choices 55.5% of the time (Britten 
et al., 1996). 
Significant choice probabilities have since been discovered in a variety of brain 
areas, including MT (Cohen and Newsome, 2009; Croner and Albright, 1999; Dodd et 
al., 2001; Law and Gold, 2008; Liu and Newsome, 2005; Purushothaman and Bradley, 
2005; Uka and DeAngelis, 2004), MST (Celebrini and Newsome, 1994), LIP (Roitman 
and Shadlen, 2002; Shadlen and Newsome, 2001), S2 (Romo et al., 2002), MPC (de 
Lafuente and Romo, 2005), V2 (Nienborg and Cumming, 2006; Nienborg and Cumming, 
2007), as well as TE and TEO in the ventral visual pathway (Uka et al., 2005).  An 
exciting sequence of studies measuring choice probability along an ascending pathway 
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involved in somatosensory perception found increasing choice probability values as the 
researchers ascended the pathway from sensory to motor areas, including S1, S2, VPC, 
MPC, and M1 (de Lafuente and Romo, 2006; Romo et al., 2004). 
In a study highly relevant to the current work, Palmer et al. (2007) conducted an 
experiment in which monkeys were engaged in a visual detection task with a Gabor patch 
target (nearly identical to the task employed in this dissertation) (Palmer et al., 2007).  
The researchers recorded single- and multi-unit activity as well as local field potential 
signals from V1 while the monkey performed the task.  For each low-contrast target 
condition, the monkeys made a mixture of correct and incorrect responses (Hits and 
Misses), allowing the researchers to apply the choice probability analysis of Britten et al. 
(1996) to this V1 dataset.  They found a mean CP value near 0.60, suggesting that on 
average, a neuron from their database could predict the monkey’s decision with 60% 
accuracy for these target-present trials.  The choice probabilities were roughly similar for 
SU, MU, and LFP measures.  Interestingly, however, when they applied the same 
analysis to the target-absent trials (comparing spike rates on False Alarms with those on 
Correct Rejections), they found no significant CP.  Nevertheless, whereas previous 
studies had failed to find significant choice-related activity in V1 (e.g., de Lafuente and 
Romo, 2005; Nienborg and Cumming, 2006) this study is the first to show significant 






1.8 Are the signals necessary to perform the task? 
Having identified signals that (1) are relevant to a particular task, (2) carry 
sufficient information to perform the task, and (3) show trial-to-trial co-variation with the 
subject’s choices, the final piece of the puzzle in implicating a single neuron in the 
stimulus-to-choice processing chain is to determine whether these signals are necessary 
to perform the task.  There are two main types of experiments used to establish this 
causal relationship. 
 First, in experiments in which neural activity and behavior are measured 
simultaneously, it is possible to ask whether physically altering the neural activity will 
correspondingly alter behavior.  In another landmark study, Salzman (1992) et al. 
reasoned that if MT neurons are used in the decision process, electrical stimulation of MT 
cells that are likely to be used by a monkey to perform the direction discrimination task 
should bias the monkey’s responses in favor of the preferred direction of the stimulated 
neurons (Salzman et al., 1992).  They began by describing the monkey’s behavior with a 
psychometric curve, which in this case described the proportion of trials in which the 
monkey chose the neuron’s preferred direction of motion.  When motion coherence was 
high the monkey nearly always chose the neuron’s preferred direction, whereas when it 
was ambiguous (zero coherence trials) they monkey made a mixture of choices to the 
preferred and non-preferred direction, and when it was negative (motion was presented in 
the opposite of the neuron’s preferred direction) the monkey almost never chose the cell’s 
preferred direction.  As before, this psychometric function rose sigmoidally from zero to 
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unity as motion coherence ranged from large negative values, through zero coherence, 
and finally to large positive values (Salzman et al., 1992). 
On a fraction of trials, the researchers stimulated MT cells by injecting a small 
amount of current through tungsten microelectrodes positioned at the center of a cluster 
of cells representing the direction of motion being discriminated.  They found that 
electrical stimulation shifted the psychometric curve leftward, meaning that stimulation 
was associated with a higher proportion of choices to the neurons’ preferred direction.  
Furthermore, they showed that the degree to which this behavioral function shifted 
leftward depended monotonically on the amount of current injected into the stimulation 
site.  This result provides strong evidence that monkeys indeed use the responses of MT 
neurons to perform the direction discrimination task. 
Other microstimulation studies have similarly demonstrated a causal relationship 
between choice behavior and neural activity in relevant brain areas, including V1 
(Tehovnik et al., 2004), MT (DeAngelis et al., 1998; Ditterich et al., 2003; Groh et al., 
1997; Liu and Newsome, 2005; Murasugi et al., 1993; Salzman et al., 1990; Salzman et 
al., 1992; Salzman and Newsome, 1994; Seidemann et al., 1998), MST (Britten and van 
Wezel, 1998; Celebrini and Newsome, 1995), FEF (Fujii et al., 1998; Seidemann et al., 
2002), S1 (Romo et al., 2000; Romo et al., 1998), MPC (de Lafuente and Romo, 2005), 
SMA (Mitz and Wise, 1987), cerebellum (Noda and Fujikado, 1987a; Noda and 
Fujikado, 1987b), and the striatum (Alexander and DeLong, 1985a; Alexander and 
DeLong, 1985b), linking these areas to specific actions or judgments (for a review, see 
Cohen and Newsome, 2004). 
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 Second, researchers can ask whether removing or inactivating the relevant 
neurons would produce performance deficits.  Researchers investigating the contribution 
of area MT to performance on the motion direction discrimination task reasoned that 
selective lesions to area MT should selectively reduce the monkey’s ability to perform 
the task (Newsome and Pare, 1988).  In this study the researchers injected into area MT 
small amounts of ibotenic acid, a neurotoxin that kills neuronal cell bodies while leaving 
the underlying white matter unaffected (Newsome and Pare, 1988).  After being injected 
with the neurotoxin, monkeys performing the direction discrimination task showed 
substantially reduced performance, with behavioral thresholds increasing by 400-800%.  
To ensure that this result was selective to MT and the motion direction discrimination 
task, the researchers performed two types of controls.  First, they tested the performance 
of the same monkeys before and after the lesions in the contralateral hemifield, and found 
that behavioral thresholds were unaffected.  Second, they measured performance on an 
unrelated orientation discrimination task, in which monkeys were required to 
discriminate between two orientations of a stationary sine wave grating at threshold 
contrasts.  Presumably, performance in the contrast-sensitivity task is mediated by 
neurons in areas outside MT and performance on this task should therefore be unaffected 
by the lesions.  Indeed the researchers found that thresholds on this task were 
indistinguishable before and after the MT lesions, in both hemifields.  These results 
provide further strong evidence that cells in MT are necessary to perform the motion 
direction discrimination task (Newsome and Pare, 1988). 
24 
 
Interestingly, the monkeys’ performance recovered several days following the 
ibotenic lesions.  This result indicates that over a short time, the brain was able to adapt 
to the injury, either by using signals from cells in MT that were not affected by the 
neurotoxin, or by using signals from other brain areas, or both.  The researchers 
addressed these possibilities by injecting additional amounts of ibotenic acid into the site 
with the goal of creating a full unilateral lesion of MT.  Following these additional 
lesions, performance again dropped to levels similar to those following the first round of 
injections, but performance again recovered somewhat (though not fully) over a period of 
three weeks following the second round of lesions (Newsome and Pare, 1988).  This fact 
underscores the parallel nature of neural processing and reminds us to consider that 
multiple brain areas could contribute to the performance of a particular psychophysical 
task, even when one area is known to be involved.  Nevertheless, this lesion study 
demonstrates unequivocally that cells in area MT are involved in the performance of the 
motion direction discrimination task. 
Other lesion studies have similarly demonstrated a causal relationship between 
perceptual judgments or motor actions and various brain areas including MT (Newsome 
and Pare, 1988; Newsome et al., 1985; Yamasaki and Wurtz, 1991), and MST (Dursteler 
and Wurtz, 1988; Yamasaki and Wurtz, 1991). 
When neither microstimulation nor lesion data are available, it is still possible to 
address the question of causality (though often not as definitively) by investigating the 
time course of signals that correlate with behavior.  For example, if the observed choice-
related signals occur only after the subject indicates his choice, it is clearly not possible 
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that the signals caused the behavior.  More likely, these signals are the result of a 
feedback mechanism in which a copy of the decision related information that drives the 
motor response is sent back to the encoding area (e.g., Nienborg and Cumming, 2010; 
Nienborg and Cumming, 2009), perhaps as a signature of attention (e.g., Nienborg and 
Cumming, 2009; Ress et al., 2000), or to adjust bias or expectations for future trials (e.g., 
Gold and Shadlen, 2003).  On the other hand, if the choice-related signals occur before 
the subject indicates his choice, it is less clear whether these signals led to the decision.  
In these cases, researchers have appealed to the shape of the choice-related signals over 
time, and parsimony, to argue that the signals in their studies are causally related, or not 
causally related, to the decision. 
 Multiple studies have appealed to a short latency between the onset of the 
stimulus-evoked response and the choice-related signal to assert that the choice-related 
signals occur as part of a feed-forward process (Britten et al., 1996; Celebrini and 
Newsome, 1994; Dodd et al., 2001; Liu and Newsome, 2005; Nienborg and Cumming, 
2006; Palmer et al., 2007; Uka and DeAngelis, 2004), though some studies have rejected 
this bottom-up interpretation in favor of a top-down explanation, again based on the 
shape of the choice-related signals over time (e.g., Nienborg and Cumming, 2009; Uka 
and DeAngelis, 2003). 
 Recent evidence for a top-down mechanism in a perceptual decision task comes 
from Nienborg and Cumming (2009).  The researchers investigated the relationship 
between V2 neurons and a monkey’s behavior in a course depth disparity discrimination 
task.  The monkey viewed a circular random dot stereogram that contained a disparity 
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signal that changed randomly on each video frame, and was required to choose at the end 
of each trial whether the stimulus appeared to be “near” or “far”.  This task design 
allowed the researchers to use reverse correlation to estimate the monkey’s 
psychophysical kernel – a picture of the mean disparity signal on trials in which the 
monkey chose “near” compared with those in which he chose “far”.  They computed the 
amplitude of the kernel as it evolved in time across the trial, and also computed the 
monkey’s choice probability as it unfolded over the same time interval.  They found that 
the amplitude of the psychophysical kernel rose sharply at the beginning of the trial and 
decreased steadily as the trial progressed; in contrast, the time course of the choice-
related signal started low, then rose to a plateau.  However, the rise in the choice-related 
signal occurred well after the peak of the kernel amplitude signal.  This finding shows 
that the V2 neurons’ correlation with choice emerged only after the monkey made its 
decision and is therefore inconsistent with a feed-forward explanation of the relationship 
between neural activity and choice.  The authors concluded that the observed choice-
related signal in V2 was the result of a top-down mechanism similar to attention 
(Nienborg and Cumming, 2009). 
 
1.9 Populations 
Taken together, the studies reviewed above constitute a great achievement in 
elucidating the neural basis of perceptual decisions.  Researchers have not only identified 
cells in the brain that are potentially useful in forming a decision about sensory stimuli, 
but have also found cells whose activity co-varies with behavioral choice, and in some 
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cases, have shown that these cells are necessary to perform the task and indeed causally 
influence the subject’s decision.  Such neurons are unequivocally implicated in the 
processing chain that connects stimulus to behavior. 
But there are critical questions that remain unanswered, and which must be 
answered if we are to have a complete picture of how a perceptual decision is formed 
from sensory evidence.  These questions are central to this dissertation. 
First, if such neurons are indeed used by the subject in the formation of a 
decision, why is the observed relationship between neural activity and behavior so weak?  
Specifically, why are the choice probability values reported in the above experiments so 
low?  Choice probabilities such as 0.555 reported in the MT experiments and 0.60 in the 
V1 experiments suggest that cells in these brain areas, which ostensibly provide the 
information upon which a subject can base an informed decision, can account for only 
approximately 56% or 60% of the choice-related information.  While the significant 
choice probabilities suggest that these neurons are related to behavior, why are the 
behavioral predictions nevertheless so weak?  What else is driving the decision? 
Second, although the accuracy of a subject can often be explained by the activity 
of a single neuron, it seems unlikely that an organism would use just a single cell to 
perform any task.  A natural question is:  if a single neuron carries so much information, 
why doesn’t the animal combine information from many such cells to improve the quality 
of the sensory evidence, and thereby gain additional information to perform even better?  
Furthermore, if some cells have been shown to carry more information than is necessary 
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to account for the monkey’s behavior, why does the monkey not use this information?  
What is the source of the inefficiency? 
It is critical to address both of these classes of questions by turning our attention 
to the activity of populations of neurons, rather than just single neurons, involved in a 
perceptual task.  Neurons, of course, do not exist in isolation; they are part of a vast 
network in which the average neuron may receive inputs from a heterogeneous 
population of one thousand or more other cells, giving rise to a complex structure of 
inter-neuronal correlations (e.g., Zohary et al., 1994) that may vary as a function of 
cortical distance (e.g., Chen et al., 2006), similarity in response properties (e.g., Kenet et 
al., 2003; Ts'o et al., 1986; Tsodyks et al., 1999) and brain area (Leopold and Logothetis, 
2003), and whose structure may be modulated by behavioral context (e.g., Gold and 
Shadlen, 2003).  Furthermore, sensory physiologists have known for many years that 
neural responses to sensory stimuli are distributed across large populations of neurons in 
sensory cortex, and thus in principle, useful task-relevant information may be distributed 
across this population as well. 
To achieve a complete picture of the formation of a perceptual decision, we must 
therefore have a cohesive model that explains the role of populations of neurons in the 
formation of the decision.  The population model should account for multiple, well-
established observations together:  (1) that sensitivities of some individual or small 
groups of neurons are comparable to behavioral sensitivities, (2) weak choice 




Two classes of models have been proposed.  The first type of model is based on 
the lower envelope principle, which states that the behavior of the subject is determined 
by the activity of the most sensitive neurons of the population.  The second type of model 
proposes that neuronal signals across the population are pooled by a central mechanism, 
which then uses the combined signals to form the decision.  Here I review the evidence 
for each model. 
 
The Lower Envelope Principle 
The lower envelope principle (LEP) hypothesizes that in order to form a decision, 
subjects rely on the activity of the most sensitive neuron, or the neuron that carries the 
most task-relevant information.  A striking illustration of the lower envelope principle 
comes from the data of Mountcastle and colleagues (Mountcastle et al., 1972; Talbot et 
al., 1968).  The researchers employed a tactile flutter detection task, in which primate 
subjects were required to detect the presence of an oscillating mechanical stimulus 
applied to the hand.  There are two classes of nerve fibers which innervate the hand and 
carry information related to a periodic stimulus:  quickly adapting (QA) fibers, which 
respond best to low frequency oscillations and thus act as low-pass filters, and Pacinian 
corpuscle (PC) fibers, which respond best to higher frequencies.  The researchers 
measured the responses of these cells in the monkey across a broad range of frequencies, 
and computed neuronal detection thresholds by determining how well a hypothetical 
observer with access to the neuronal response distributions could detect the stimulus.  
They found that at each stimulus frequency, the detection thresholds of the nerve fibers 
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varied from cell to cell, in both QA fibers and PC fibers.  They also found that in the low 
frequency ranges, the lowest detection thresholds were found in the QA fibers whereas in 
the higher frequency ranges the lowest thresholds were found in the PC fibers, as 
expected.  The researchers then defined the theoretically best detection performance 
across all frequency ranges as the curve that followed the lowest detection thresholds of 
either the QA or the PC fibers, which was determined by the QA fibers in the low 
frequencies and the PC fibers in the high frequencies. 
The researchers compared these neural sensitivities to psychophysical detection 
thresholds in both monkey and human observers across the same frequency range and 
obtained an intriguing result:  detection thresholds in both species, when plotted as a 
function of stimulus frequency, followed the lower envelope of the neuronal detection 
thresholds obtained from the QA or PC fibers.  In other words, the psychophysical 
thresholds were predicted by the most sensitive neurons at each frequency, regardless of 
whether the best neuronal performance was achieved by QA or PC fibers.  This striking 
result provides support for the idea that behavioral sensitivity is determined by the 
sensitivity of the most informative neurons. 
The lower envelope principle could explain the results of the many studies 
reviewed above in which neuronal sensitivity of single neurons was comparable to the 
behavioral sensitivity of the subject.  Furthermore, there have been a variety of additional 
studies that are compatible with this principle, including studies measuring behavioral 
and neuronal performance in tasks suited for neurons in MT (Purushothaman and 
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Bradley, 2005), LGN (De Valois et al., 1967), cat auditory cortex (Eggermont, 1999), 
somatosensory cortex (Talbot et al., 1968), and V1 (Tolhurst et al., 1983). 
 However, there are important concerns with the biological plausibility of 
implementing such a mechanism in the brain.  Foremost among them:  if a single neuron 
is responsible for the behavioral performance of a subject, how does the decision 
mechanism select this neuron from the thousands of candidates?  For the brain to achieve 
this feat, it would need to monitor a large pool of neurons, determine which neuron 
provides the highest fidelity information about the stimulus, and then ignore all other 
neurons in the pool.  Furthermore, in this rubric where behavior is determined by a single 
neuron, Parker and Newsome remind us that logically, it can’t be the same neuron on 
every trial (Parker and Newsome, 1998).  For example, in a variant of the flutter detection 
task described above, suppose that the stimulus consists not just of a pure frequency of 
stimulation, but of a combination of frequencies.  In this case, because there is variation 
in the neuronal responses from trial to trial, it is likely that detection on a given trial could 
be best accomplished by monitoring one of the QA fibers, or one of the PC fibers (Parker 
and Newsome, 1998), but that the most informative fiber may reside in the QA 
population on one trial and in the PC population on the next. 
 Furthermore, this problem of selection may be magnified in the central nervous 
system.  As Parker and Newsome (1998) point out, many of the studies providing support 
for the LEP come from investigations in the peripheral nervous system.  Anatomically, 
peripheral pathways diverge as they enter the central nervous system, implying that the 
same signals, which in the periphery may be confined to a small number of neurons, 
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become distributed over a much larger population as they make their way into ever-
higher regions of the CNS.  This means that the challenge of finding the right neuron is 
likely magnified as afferent signals reach more central areas. 
 
Pooling 
The pooling hypothesis suggests that perceptual decisions are determined not by 
the activity of the most sensitive neuron, but rather by the combined activity of a 
population of neurons.  Shadlen et al. performed one of the earliest comprehensive 
modeling exercises demonstrating the success of the pooling concept (Shadlen et al., 
1996).  They focused on data gathered over the years from monkey MT in the classic 
motion direction discrimination paradigm (Britten et al., 1996; Celebrini and Newsome, 
1994; Newsome et al., 1989; Zohary et al., 1994).  In this study, the authors sought to use 
the pooling hypothesis to reconcile three observations of these MT studies:  that single 
MT neurons are on average sufficiently sensitive to account for the monkey’s accuracy; 
that MT neurons are weakly correlated with choice; and that MT neurons are weakly 
correlated with one another. 
 A critical observation is at the heart of their strategy and reasoning:  correlations 
among neurons limit the effectiveness of pooling.  This fact has been long recognized, 
though this work is among the earlier studies to incorporate it into a cohesive theory.  To 
illustrate, consider first a population of statistically independent MT neurons.  Each 
neuron carries information about the direction of motion, responding more strongly to 
high coherence motion than to low coherence motion.  As reviewed above, the ability of 
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this neuron to discriminate direction of motion is limited by the stochastic nature of its 
responses.  However, by averaging this neuron’s responses with those of a second, 
statistically independent neuron, the average variability is reduced because the neurons 
share no common noise.  By incorporating ever more neurons into the calculation, the 
variability continues to be averaged out in the familiar way, providing a reduction in 
noise proportional to the square root of the total number of neurons included in the 
average. 
 In contrast, if the neurons included in the averaging pool share a common noise 
source, then a simple average of their responses will reduce noise less effectively.  In the 
limit where all neurons share 100% of their variability with one another, averaging would 
provide no additional information whatsoever.  In reality, neurons in MT are neither 
independent nor 100% correlated; they may share approximately 0.12 of their variability 
on average (Zohary et al., 1994).  This finding implies that as neurons are added to the 
pool, the discrimination performance of the pool will improve, but only to a limit. 
 The presence of correlated noise is expected to increase choice probability.  
Consider a case where the animal’s choice is based solely on the population in MT.  If the 
neurons share 100% of their variability with one another, then the activity of a single 
neuron is identical to that of the pool, and because no other factor drives the subject’s 
decision in this example, variation in choice is entirely accounted for by this neuron.  In 
the presence of weaker correlations, however, the variation in this single neuron explains 
only a fraction of the total variability of the population upon which the subject’s choices 
are based; under these circumstances we expect the relationship between this neuron’s 
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variability and the subject’s choice behavior to weaken.  If the neurons in the pool shared 
no common noise, the single neuron would account for an immeasurably small fraction of 
the subject’s choice behavior (Shadlen et al., 1996). 
 The researchers also considered the effect of downstream noise, or independent 
noise that influences the subject’s decision but that is added after the pool has been 
averaged.  The presence of downstream noise should decrease the subject’s accuracy 
even while the sensitivity of single neurons remains the same; it should also decrease 
choice probability.  This type of independent noise degrades the fidelity with which the 
pooled response represents the stimulus feature, and thus reduces the amount of task-
related information available to the subject at this critical decision stage.  The addition of 
downstream noise also obscures the relationship between the variability of single MT 
neurons and that of the subject’s choices because under these circumstances the subject’s 
decisions are based in part on random variation that is not captured in the experimenters’ 
measurement. 
The researchers explored these relationships in a series of computational models.  
They varied the number of neurons contributing to each pool, and sought to find a pool 
size that could account simultaneously for the measured neuronal sensitivity, behavioral 
sensitivity, inter-neuronal correlations, and choice probability.  Their model architecture 
consisted of two pools of neurons, one pool preferring the direction of motion presented, 
and the other preferring the opposite direction.  On each trial, the responses in each pool 
are averaged together, and the averages from the two pools are compared.  If the 
‘preferred’ pool’s average response is greater, then their simulated monkey chose 
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“preferred”; otherwise the subject chose “null.”  In this model the researchers fixed the 
average correlations among neurons to 0.12, following the experimental observations of 
Zohary et al. (1994).  The key free parameters in their model were the number of neurons 
N in each pool, the sensitivity of each neuron, a scaling factor to model the inclusion of 
sub-optimal neurons, and pooling noise (variability added to the decision variable after 
averaging each pool). 
 In the simplest model, only the best available neurons were considered (neurons 
collected in the experiments whose tuning preferences were matched to the stimuli).  No 
pooling noise was added at this stage.  The researchers ran simulated experiments by 
presenting a simulated motion signal to the neurons and observing their responses.  When 
only one neuron contributed to each pool, the sensitivity matched that of the observed 
sensitivities, consistent with their experimental observation (Newsome et al., 1989).  
Increasing the number of neurons improved discrimination thresholds, but only to values 
too low to account for the real experimental results.  Examining the effect on choice 
probability, they found that in this framework a single neuron should provide a CP near 
0.80, a value too high to match the real data.  Adding neurons to the pool did reduce 
choice probability, but due to even the modest correlation coefficient used, this reduction 
was limited in principle, and leveled off to a value near 0.65, still too high to account for 
the real data.  Thus this simple version of the model could not find a single pool size that 
could reconcile all the experimental observations simultaneously. 
 To improve their model, the researchers reasoned that including non-optimal 
neurons in each pool should reduce the sensitivity of the pool as a whole because they 
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will corrupt the high fidelity signals provided by optimal neurons.  This version of the 
model is perhaps more plausible if one assumes that the animal has difficulty selecting 
the best neurons in a given task, as suggested above in the section on the lower envelope 
principle.   When including less sensitive neurons, the researchers found that while the 
sensitivity of a randomly selected neuron was lower than that observed experimentally 
(consistent with their reasoning that non-optimal neurons corrupt the high quality 
signals), they could easily regain the sensitivity of the model by averaging over just four 
or so neurons to reduce this noise.  On the other hand, the addition of non-optimal 
neurons had no effect on choice probability, regardless of pool size, and so the modeled 
CP remained too high to match the data. 
Finally, the researchers added central pooling noise downstream to the sensory 
neurons, and were able to find a value for this noise that made the predicted thresholds 
match those of the real subjects, and a value that matched the observed CP values; but no 
single value of pooling noise could match both simultaneously.  However, by adding both 
downstream pooling noise and non-optimal neurons, they found values of pooling noise, 
and a pool size, that could simultaneously account for both the sensitivity results as well 
as the choice probability results. 
With this success in hand, the researchers aimed to account for an additional 
experimental observation:  that more sensitive neurons showed higher choice 
probabilities (Britten et al., 1996; Celebrini and Newsome, 1994).  The empirically 
reported inter-neuronal correlation of 0.12 for area MT is an average value, but there is 
considerable variability in this value across neuron pairs (Zohary et al., 1994).  To 
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explore the consequences of this fact, the researchers added heterogeneity to the structure 
of pairwise correlations across the population.  They reasoned that neurons that are more 
tightly correlated with the rest of the neurons contributing to the average should co-vary 
more tightly with the pooled average, and therefore the decisions (Shadlen et al., 1996).  
Indeed, by assigning correlation coefficients between pairs of neurons proportional to 
their sensitivity, they were able to reproduce the result that higher CP values are 
associated with more sensitive neurons. 
 This investigation and others that support a pooling mechanism (e.g., Britten et 
al., 1992; Darian-Smith et al., 1973; Kiang et al., 1965; Siebert, 1965) and those that 
address the effects of inter-neuronal correlations on signal quality and choice behavior 
(e.g., Gawne et al., 1996; Gawne and Richmond, 1993; Johnson, 1980; Johnson et al., 
1973; van Kan et al., 1985) are critical to this dissertation, because they lay out the 
framework for simultaneously accounting for key empirical measures (neuronal 
sensitivity, behavioral sensitivity, choice probability, and inter-neuronal correlations) by 
appealing to populations rather than single neurons.  They uncover three general 
principles that are central to the modeling studies presented in this dissertation: 
 
1. Inter-neuronal correlations reduce pooling efficacy 
2. Inter-neuronal correlations increase choice probability 





Pooling and lower envelope principle compared 
Geisler and Albrecht (1997) performed a study that considers both the lower 
envelope principle and the pooling hypothesis.  To determine whether visual neurons 
contain sufficient information to perform various tasks, the researchers measured spiking 
activity from neurons in V1 of anesthetized cats and monkeys, while the animals were 
shown drifting sine wave gratings of various contrasts, spatial positions, orientations, 
spatial frequencies, temporal frequencies, and directions of motion.  The responses of 
these cells were fitted with descriptive functions, allowing the researchers to determine 
each neuron’s hypothetical performance on a detection, discrimination, or identification 
task.  They then compared the performance of these neurons to the performance of 
human and monkey observers engaged in an identical task, and found that the responses 
of the best performing cells in V1 were able to account for the accuracy of the subjects.  
However, they also tested the pooling hypothesis by combining the signals across 
neurons in a mathematically optimal fashion, and found that the optimally pooled signals 
also were able to account for performance.  Thus their results appeared to be compatible 
with both the lower envelope principle and population pooling.  However, one 
observation was incompatible with the idea that performance could be explained by the 
most sensitive neurons.  The researchers point out that in a contrast discrimination task, 
the most sensitive neuron covers only a limited range of contrasts, unlike psychophysical 
performance.  Based on this observation, they conclude that contrast discrimination 
performance more likely reflects the pooled information of a variety of neurons, each 
with its own contrast sensitivity function (Geisler and Albrecht, 1997). 
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 In practice, the lower envelope principle may be regarded as a special case of the 
pooling hypothesis because basing behavioral responses on the activity of a single neuron 
is the formal equivalent of a pooling procedure with a weight of unity assigned to the 
neuron in question and weights of zero assigned to all other neurons.  Thus in practice, 
distinguishing between the two hypotheses may be achieved by first assuming the more 
general pooling framework, and then discovering the actual weights assigned to the 
various neurons that potentially contribute to a decision.  This analysis is performed in 
Chapter 3. 
 
1.10 Accounting for behavioral sensitivity with neuronal populations 
A recent study (Chen et al., 2006) used voltage-sensitive dye imaging (VSDI, 
reviewed below) to examine the neuronal sensitivity of an entire population of neurons 
by imaging the activity of V1 as a monkey performed a visual detection task (a task 
similar to that used in the present experiments).  The VSDI responses to a small Gabor 
stimulus were distributed across a population of cells over a few mm of cortex.  As in the 
studies reviewed above, the researchers asked whether the sensitivity of the VSDI 
population signals could account for the sensitivity of the monkey.  They examined a 
family of candidate pooling models that combined the signals across space to form the 
decision variable.  The pooling models examined included one that chooses only the 
maximal response location on each trial, a model that chooses only the location with the 
best signal-to-noise ratio, simple average models with uniform weights over various sized 
regions, and models that compute a weighted average of the signals, with weights 
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proportional to either the signal amplitude at each location or signal-to-noise ratio at each 
location.  Importantly, as discussed above, the presence of weak spatial correlations 
across the population of neurons limited the effectiveness of these pooling rules.  The 
researchers derived the mathematically optimal readout mechanism, which takes into 
account the observed correlations across space.  Due to the structure of the correlated 
noise, the optimal model consisted of a weighted average with weights defined by a 
difference of Gaussians, where positive weights were given to a region centered on the 
peak of the evoked response and negative weights were given to the surrounding region.  
The accuracy of this optimal model in the visual detection task outperformed that of the 
monkey.  The authors concluded because the V1 signals contain more than enough 
information to account for the monkey’s accuracy, there must be some form of 
inefficiency in how the monkey uses these signals.  This inefficiency could be due to the 
monkey’s use of a non-optimal pooling rule, or the presence of downstream decision 
noise, or both. 
Importantly, while the Chen et al. study answered how a monkey should read out 
V1 population signals to perform a detection task, in this dissertation I ask how a monkey 
does read out the population signals.  This allows us to address the source of the 
monkey’s inefficiency.  In this dissertation, I present a theoretical model that explains 
how the quality of the population signal is degraded by the monkey’s readout algorithm, 
and use this model to determine the sources of inefficiency in task performance.  This 




1.11 Kinds of inefficiency 
The Chen et al. study demonstrates that populations of neurons in V1 carry more 
than enough information to account for the monkey’s performance in the visual detection 
task (Chen et al., 2006), implying that some signals that are available to the monkey are 
not being used.  What is the source of the inefficiency?  In principle, there are at least two 
reasons why the monkey may not be able to make efficient use of all the information 
carried by the neural population. 
 First, to extract the most information possible from the V1 population, it is 
necessary to pool the signals appropriately, as the Chen et al. study shows.  The 
researchers found that the mathematically optimal pooling procedure was to weight the 
signals across space by a difference of Gaussians, consisting of positive weights on the 
center of the evoked response and negative weights in a surround region.  This procedure 
effectively whitens the spatially correlated noise, maximizing the information gained by 
pooling while minimizing common noise.  It is possible, however, that uncertainty about 
the stimulus could limit the monkey’s ability to use such an algorithm.  If the monkey has 
internal uncertainty about the stimulus, such as its exact location in visual space, the 
Chen et al. optimal model cannot be effective because it assumes that the readout 
mechanism has perfect knowledge about where the stimulus will appear. 
 A recent pair of experimental and modeling studies supports the idea that a 
subject’s performance is significantly limited by the ability of the brain to decode sensory 
information (Law and Gold, 2008; Law and Gold, 2009).  In this work, the researchers 
recorded single unit activity in areas MT and LIP while monkeys learned to perform the 
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motion direction discrimination task.  They found that as training progressed across 
sessions, the improvement in psychophysical performance was accompanied by an 
improvement in sensitivity of LIP neurons, but not in MT neurons (Law and Gold, 2008).  
LIP receives rich anatomical projections from MT and carries decision-relevant signals 
based on motion direction evidence from MT neurons (Huk and Shadlen, 2005; Mazurek 
et al., 2003).  Thus this study demonstrates that training improves signal quality in the 
decision stage, but not in the encoding stage, a result consistent with the idea that training 
improves decoding of sensory signals.  The researchers confirmed in a subsequent 
modeling study that the observed improvement in behavior could indeed be explained by 
a reinforcement learning procedure in which LIP signals reflect an increasingly efficient 
decoding of fixed, stimulus-related signals in MT (Law and Gold, 2009). 
 A second way in which high quality information in a sensory area could be 
degraded is by the addition of downstream, stimulus-irrelevant noise.  For example LIP 
neurons, which accumulate evidence provided by area MT about a motion stimulus (Huk 
and Shadlen, 2005), are inherently variable.  If such a neuron’s response is evaluated 
against a criterion in order to determine the decision, this additional random variability 
will sometimes cause the neuron’s response to cross the criterion and elicit a behavior 
even before sufficient evidence has been reached, and vice versa.  A similar effect can 
occur when the subject has some uncertainty or variability in the value of the criterion 
itself.  This variability, termed criterial noise, also results in the mixing of the two 
distributions by causing some responses from the lower distribution to exceed the 
criterion, and vice versa, and produces the same effects. 
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1.12 Stimulus versus choice 
In another of the few studies measuring population activity in early visual cortex 
while subjects performed a pattern detection task, Ress and Heeger (2003) found an 
interesting relationship between neural activity and choice.  The researchers measured 
population activity in V1, V2, V3, V3a, and V4 by fMRI while four human subjects 
attempted to detect slight contrast increments against a noisy background.  Behavioral 
responses were collected and grouped into the usual signal detection theory categories of 
Hit, Miss, False Alarm, and Correct Rejection.  The retinotopically specific activity in 
these areas was then analyzed separately for each of the behavioral categories.  They 
found that the activity during Hit trials exceeded that during Miss trials, and that activity 
during False Alarm trials exceeded that during Correct Rejection trials, results that are 
expected from the signal detection theory framework (Ress and Heeger, 2003).  
Importantly, they also found that the activity on False Alarm trials exceeded that on Miss 
trials.  In other words, the activity in these early visual areas corresponded more closely 
to the subject’s choice than to the physical stimulus. 
At first this result may be surprising:  we might expect that early sensory areas 
encode stimuli, and should therefore represent stimulus-related activity, while later brain 
areas hold decision variables, and should represent decision-related activity.  However, 
that False Alarm activity exceeds Miss activity is in fact the expected result from signal 
detection theory if the majority of the choice-related noise was captured in their 
measurements, as I show in Chapter 2.  It is plausible that the researchers captured the 
majority of the choice-related activity, for two reasons.  First, the activity was measured 
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over a large population of neurons, perhaps leaving few task-relevant sensory neurons 
unaccounted for.  And second, consistent with the conclusions of the Law and Gold 
studies reviewed above, variability in downstream decisional areas is likely to be reduced 
in well-trained subjects.  This reduction can occur either by the application of an 
increasingly efficient spatial pooling algorithm or by a direct reduction in noise of the 
decision variable or criterion, leaving little choice-related neural variability unaccounted 
for during sensory population measurements.  In Chapter 2, I demonstrate that the 
relationship between False Alarm activity and Miss activity is a critical indicator of how 
much choice-related variability is present in an experimenter’s measurement of a given 
brain area. 
 
1.13 Voltage-sensitive Dye Imaging (VSDI) 
 Optical imaging with voltage-sensitive dyes (VSDs) is a modern technique that 
measures neural population responses at high spatial and temporal resolution (Grinvald et 
al., 1988; Grinvald and Hildesheim, 2004; Shoham et al., 1999).  In this technique, blue 
dye molecules applied topically to the cortex bind to neuronal membranes and produce a 
linear change in fluorescence in response to changes in membrane potential.  The dye 
signal is thought to represent locally summed, sub-threshold neural activity (Shoham et 
al., 1999).  The signal is therefore similar to measurements of local field potential (LFP) 
and event related scalp potentials (ERPs), though it may have a stronger contribution 
from intracellular components (Grinvald et al., 1984).  Compared with measurements of 
similar time resolution, VSDI pools over a larger region than single- and multi-unit 
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recordings, but is more spatially localized than the local field potential (Grinvald, 2005), 
and thus does not suffer from the source localization problems that scalp potentials do.  
Compared with other measurements of population activity, such as the hemodynamic 
measurements of PET and fMRI, the VSDI signal provides higher spatial resolution, 
albeit over a smaller region.  Its main advantage over other imaging techniques is that it 
can simultaneously achieve the time resolution of single unit electrophysiology and 
ERPs, while providing high-spatial resolution across a distributed population of neurons. 
 Voltage-sensitive dye imaging has been used to measure neural activity in the squid 
giant axon (Grinvald and Hildesheim, 2004), whisker barrels of rat somatosensory cortex 
(Petersen et al., 2003; Petersen and Sakmann, 2001), the optic tectum of the frog 
(Grinvald et al., 1984), salamander olfactory bulb (Cinelli et al., 1995a; Cinelli and 
Kauer, 1995; Cinelli et al., 1995b), visual cortex of the cat (Arieli et al., 1996), and has 
been successfully applied to measuring population responses in the awake behaving 
monkey (Seidemann et al., 2002; Slovin et al., 2002).  The development of an artificial 
dura, which replaces the optically opaque dura mater in a subject with an optically 
transparent silicone substitute (Arieli et al., 2002), has allowed researchers to image 
cortical dynamics in monkeys over long periods of time.  With this advancement, 
researchers can measure VSDI signals from the same patch of cortex across multiple 
sessions spanning up to a year without significant damage to the tissue due to infection or 
phototoxicity (Chen et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2008; Slovin et al., 2002). 
 Recent VSDI experiments in awake, behaving monkeys have shown the excellent 
sensitivity of the dye measurements (Chen et al., 2006).  Chen et al. measured neural 
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population responses in monkey V1 while the animal performed a threshold visual 
detection task (a task similar to that used in the experiments presented in this 
dissertation).  As reviewed above, the researchers compared detection thresholds of an 
ideal observer with access to the dye signals to behavioral detection thresholds of the 
monkey.  They found that detection thresholds as determined by the neural population 
activity were lower than the simultaneously collected behavioral thresholds, 
demonstrating that the sensitivity of the dye measurement exceeds the sensitivity of the 
entire organism (Chen et al., 2006). 
 VSDI is thus the ideal technique for addressing the questions outlined in this 
introduction.  First, VSDI permits the measurement of a large population of neurons, and 
therefore allows us to address fundamental questions about perceptual decision-making in 
the context of populations rather than single neurons.  Second, because VSDI can be 
achieved in awake, behaving monkeys, we can employ this technique in a choice-
probability paradigm.  Together with simple computational models, this experimental 
approach allows us to quantify the fraction of choice-related variability present in a 
sensory cortical population, and also allows us to estimate, for the first time, a spatial 
pooling algorithm that may provide the mechanism for a simple decision. 
 
1.14 Summary 
A considerable body of research has evaluated the role of sensory neurons in the 
formation of a perceptual decision by examining their responses to stimuli, their overall 
sensitivity in comparison with behavioral sensitivity, their co-variation with behavioral 
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choice, and their causal relationship to choice.  Across a variety of brain areas and 
sensory modalities, researchers have often found that (1) the sensitivity of a single or 
small groups of neurons can account for the subject’s performance, (2) single neurons 
show weak co-variation with choice, and (3) neurons within a given brain area are 
weakly correlated with one another. 
Modeling studies have attempted to reconcile these findings into a cohesive 
framework by appealing to populations of neurons rather than neurons in isolation.  The 
general conclusions of such exercises are that (1) inter-neuronal correlations reduce 
pooling efficacy, (2) inter-neuronal correlations increase choice probability, and (3) 
downstream noise reduces both behavioral sensitivity and choice probability. 
Two recent studies measuring neural activity and behavior simultaneously in a 
visual detection task have demonstrated significant choice probability in monkey V1 for 
the first time (Palmer et al., 2007), and demonstrated that optimally pooled populations of 
V1 neurons can more than account for the monkey’s sensitivity (Chen et al., 2006; Chen 
et al., 2008) in this task. 
In this dissertation, I employ a visual detection task with large repetitions of trials 
at the monkey’s behavioral threshold, while simultaneously imaging neural population 
activity in V1 by VSDI as the monkey performs the task.  This allows the simultaneous 
population measurement of each of the critical variables reviewed in this introduction:  




Within this research paradigm, I pursue two classes of questions that further our 
fundamental understanding of how decisions are formed: 
 
1. How is choice-related variability distributed across sensory cortex, and what 
fraction of choice-related variability is present in population activity in V1, the 
earliest cortical area in which visual information is encoded in the primate brain?  
To what degree does this sensory cortical variability limit perceptual decisions? 
2. How does the monkey combine information across the sensory population to form 








Understanding how perceptual decisions are formed in the brain is a long-
standing goal of systems neuroscience.  Previous research in monkeys has found neural 
activity that correlates with decisions as early as primary sensory cortex, but these single-
neuron recordings show only weak correlations with choice.  This weak relationship 
implies that single sensory cortical neurons capture only a small fraction of the choice-
related variability:  such variability may be distributed across a large population of cells 
in sensory cortex, and may also occur in other areas downstream from early sensory 
cortex.  Here we use a combination of direct measurement of neural population responses 
in primary visual cortex (V1) by voltage-sensitive dye imaging and a simple 
computational model to show that V1 encompasses most of the choice-related variability 
in highly trained monkeys engaged in a demanding visual pattern detection task.  Our 
results are consistent with previously reported observations of weak single-neuron 
choice-related signals, and weak inter-neuronal correlations.  Overall, our results suggest 
that simple perceptual decisions are formed by pooling information across a large 
population of weakly correlated sensory neurons, and that most choice-related variability 






When an organism is faced with a challenging perceptual task, is behavioral 
performance limited primarily by neural variability that is already present in early 
sensory cortical areas, or is it limited primarily by variability that occurs in brain areas 
downstream from early sensory cortex?  One potential way to address this fundamental 
question is to measure neuronal activity in the relevant early sensory cortical area within 
the relevant epoch and assess the extent to which the measured activity is correlated with 
variability in perceptual decisions.  If such measurements are highly predictive of 
behavioral choice, then most choice-related variability must reside in the sensory area, 
implying that downstream circuits can add only a small amount of independent choice-
related variability. 
Previous studies of the relationship between neural and behavioral variability 
have discovered co-variations between responses of individual neurons in sensory cortex 
and a subject’s behavioral choices to repeated presentations of an identical near-threshold 
sensory stimulus (Britten et al., 1996; Celebrini and Newsome, 1994; Cook and 
Maunsell, 2002; de Lafuente and Romo, 2005; Dodd et al., 2001; Nienborg and 
Cumming, 2006; Nienborg and Cumming, 2009; Palmer et al., 2007; Purushothaman and 
Bradley, 2005; Uka and DeAngelis, 2004).  These co-variations, however, tend to be very 
weak, implying that individual neurons capture only a small fraction of the neural 
variability related to decisions.  The large amount of choice-related variability that is 
unaccounted for in single-neuron studies may be distributed across other (unmeasured) 
sensory neurons, and may also occur downstream from the sensory area.  Even if the 
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majority of choice-related variability occurred in a distributed sensory cortical 
population, single neurons still may not provide strong predictions of choice because 
sensory neurons are only weakly correlated with one another (e.g., Zohary et al., 1994), 
and therefore, one neuron’s responses are only weakly related to the population response.  
Thus single-neuron studies cannot provide strong constraints on whether perceptual 
decisions are predominantly limited by sensory or downstream variability. 
In contrast to single-neuron electrophysiology, methods for measuring neural 
population responses, such as voltage-sensitive dye imaging (VSDI) (Grinvald and 
Hildesheim, 2004), have the potential to provide stronger constraints by capturing a 
larger fraction of the choice-related variability within the sensory area.  Because even 
simple, spatially localized stimuli evoke responses over a broad region of sensory cortex 
(Chen et al., 2006; Grinvald et al., 1994; Palmer et al., 2011), and because these sensory 
cortical neurons are only weakly correlated with one another, subjects can benefit from 
combining these distributed signals to inform decisions.  Thus, perceptual decisions may 
be based on the combined activity from a large population of sensory neurons.  In this 
case, population measures may show stronger co-variations with choice, and thus account 
for a greater fraction of the choice-related neural variability.  However, such methods 
tend to be susceptible to various sources of variability unrelated to choice, such as 
measurement noise, which can weaken the relationship between the measured neural 
activity and behavior. 
To address the possibility that choice-related activity is distributed across many 
sensory neurons, we used VSDI to record from a large population of neurons in primary 
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visual cortex (V1) of two monkeys while they performed a difficult visual detection task.  
To better understand the relationship between measurements of neural variability and 
perceptual decisions, we developed a simple computational model and metric.  This 
model is advantageous over previous methods, as it can be used to quantify the fraction 
of choice-related variability captured in a measurement of neural population response 
independent of choice-unrelated variability.  Together, this approach allows us to 
determine a lower bound on the fraction of choice-related variability that occurs in the 
primary visual cortex during performance of a detection task.   
 
2.3 Materials and Methods 
Task and visual stimuli 
All procedures were approved by the University of Texas Institutional Animal 
Care and Use Committee and conformed to NIH standards.  Similar task and VSDI 
processing methods have been described previously (Chen et al., 2006; Chen et al., 
2008).  Briefly, monkeys were trained to perform a reaction-time visual detection task.  
Each trial began after the monkey established fixation on a 0.1° square fixation point 
displayed against a uniform gray background.  The target was a small Gabor patch 
(sinusoidal grating modulated by a 2-D Gaussian envelope; σ = 0.17°, spatial frequency = 
2.76 cycles/°, phase = 90°) that appeared at a fixed location (eccentricity = 4.28° for 
Monkey T, 1.58° for Monkey C).  The Gabor stimuli appeared at one or two discrete 
target contrast levels at or near the monkey’s psychophysical detection threshold (2.6%-
5%), and were held constant throughout each session. 
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During the stimulus-detection task, in order to indicate a “target-present” choice, 
the monkey was required to shift gaze to the location of the target within 900 ms from 
target onset (but not sooner than 75 ms after target onset) and maintain gaze at that 
location for an additional 100 ms in order to receive the liquid reward.  The target 
remained on for 300 ms or until the monkey initiated a saccade.  On all trials in which the 
monkey made a saccadic eye movement towards the target location during the relevant 
temporal interval, shortly after the monkey initiated a saccade a small point appeared at 
the target location to help the monkey maintain post-saccadic fixation and to provide a 
visual reminder of the correct target location.  In target-absent trials, the monkey was 
required to maintain fixation within a small window (< 2° full width) around the fixation 
point for an additional 900 ms in order to obtain a reward.  The monkeys made a mixture 
of correct and incorrect responses on both target-absent and target-present trials, allowing 
us to examine neural activity during Hit, Miss, FA, and CR outcomes (for details see 
Table 2.1).  On some trials, the monkey’s behavioral responses were classified as invalid, 
and were not analyzed further.  These trials included cases in which the monkey’s gaze 
left the fixation window too early, or left the fixation window during the allowed interval 
but did not arrive in the target window, or arrived in the target window during the 
allowed interval but did not remain in the target window for the required time.  Out of the 
total number of trials presented to the monkey, 93% for Monkey T and 92% for Monkey 
C were classified as valid trials culminating in a Hit, Miss, FA, or CR outcome.  Visual 
stimuli were presented on a gamma-corrected 21” color display at a fixed mean 
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luminance of 30 cd/m2. The display subtended 20.5° x 15.4° at a viewing distance of 108 
cm, had a pixel resolution of 1024 x 768, 30-bit color depth, and a refresh rate of 100Hz. 
 On each day of data collection, the monkey initially performed the detection task 
in a short block of trials that included a range of target contrasts.  One or two contrasts 
producing a mix of behavioral outcomes were chosen for use in the subsequent imaging 
experiment.  In cases in which more than one target contrast was used during imaging, 
the normalization described below was applied separately to trials belonging to each 
target condition.  This additional normalization was done to ensure that differences in 
physiology were related to the monkey’s choices and not to differences in the physical 
stimulus. 
 
VSDI recording and signal pre-processing 
While the monkey performed the task, we recorded neural population signals in 




where each pixel corresponds to 0.5x0.5 mm2 of cortex.  Our basic VSDI signal pre-
processing is divided into five steps:  (i) normalize the responses at each site (a binned 
group of pixels) by the average fluorescence at that site across all trials and camera 
frames; (ii) average responses over a limited spatial region to obtain a single waveform 
for each trial; (iii) subtract from each waveform the temporal average over an 80 ms 
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interval centered on the stimulus onset time; (iv) average responses over a post-stimulus 
temporal interval to obtain a single number for each trial; (v) remove trials with aberrant 
VSDI responses.  The normalization in step (i) serves to minimize the effects of uneven 
illumination and staining.  The spatial averaging in (ii) is over a rectangular area of 
2.5x2.5 mm2 centered on the location with the most reliable response (maximal d’) 
obtained on control trials at high (25%) target contrast.  The temporal interval over which 
each trial’s optical responses are averaged in step (iv) begins 120 ms before the median 
response time on Hit and False Alarms trials, and ends 20 ms before the median response 
time, or 20 ms before the response time in that particular trial, whichever was earlier.  
The median RT ranged from 319 to 407 ms across experiments in Monkey T, and from 
263 to 274 ms in Monkey C.  We explored other temporal intervals over which to 
average activity, including intervals that were longer as well as shorter than that used 
here, and also explored temporal intervals that were time-locked to the saccadic eye 
movements, but did not find any differences that affected our main conclusions (see 
Table 2.3).  This observation is likely due to low frequency temporal correlations present 
in the VSDI response (Chen et al., 2008).  To remove trials with aberrant VSDI 
responses, we computed the average response on each trial over a 2.5x2.5 mm2 region 
centered on the evoked response and during the temporal averaging window; we 
subtracted from each trial the mean response across all trials (performed separately for 
each target contrast condition), and excluded from further analysis trials with residual 
responses greater than 3 standard deviations from the mean.  This simple procedure 
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eliminated trials in which the animal made excessive movements (typically less than 1% 
of the trials). 
To obtain a single number representing the neural activity on each trial, we first 
averaged responses at each location over the temporal averaging window.  We then 
pooled responses over space by the application of various pooling algorithms (see 
below).  We normalized all pooled responses by subtracting the mean response during 
target-absent trials, and dividing the result by the mean response during target-present 
trials. 
We combined experiments across multiple recording sessions and two monkeys.  
We aligned the VSDI responses across multiple experiments by fitting the stimulus-
evoked response to a high contrast (25%) Gabor stimulus (collected during control blocks 
before each imaging session) with a 2-dimensional Gaussian.  We then re-centered the 
responses of each experiment such that the peak of each experiment’s fitted response 
occurred at a common pixel. 
 
Model and ML estimation 
Our model framework of the subject's decision process is outlined in Fig. 2.2.  We 
started with the assumption of three Gaussian, additive noise sources:  shared sensory 
noise ; independent downstream decision-related noise ; and independent 
measurement noise .  We assume these noise sources to be a zero mean Gaussians 
with variances ,  and , respectively.  We have previously shown that our results 
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are consistent with Gaussian additive noise (Chen et al., 2006) and we performed similar 
tests to verify these properties in our present data (see Fig. 2.8). 
The subject's decision variable is defined as , where  is 
a binary variable that represents the absence or presence of the visual target.  The 
measured pooled response is defined by .  Given these ingredients, the 
probability of the observed outcomes  and the subject’s decision  on a single trial is 
given by:    
 
              (2.1) 
 
where  is a binary variable that represents whether or not the subject reported 
seeing the target ,  is the subject's criterion, and  are the standard normal 
probability density function (pdf) and cumulative density function (cdf), respectively, 
 is the total measurement noise variance,  is the ratio of shared 
to total measurement noise variance, and  is the conditional standard 
deviation of .  We obtained maximum likelihood fits of the model parameters 
 by numerical optimization of the log-likelihood (given by the log of Eq. 
2.1, summed over all trials) using MATLAB's fmincon. 
To obtain an intuition about the dependence of our measured quantities on the 
relative contribution of various sources of variability, we performed a series of simulated 
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experiments.  In these simulations we fixed the decision criterion T, and the total 
decision-related variability σtd2, to values that reproduced the average behavioral 
accuracy of our monkeys (75%) and the observed distribution of errors (see Table 2.1).  
The sensory portion of this variability σs2 was varied systematically across simulated 
experiments from 0 to σtd2, and in each experiment the subject’s downstream variability, 
σd2, was equal to the remainder, σtd2 – σs2.  In each experiment, the decision variable was 
compared to a criterion to determine the simulated subject’s choices.  In addition, we 
added zero-mean Gaussian noise σm to the sensory responses to obtain a simulated 
measured response.  DF was defined as the ratio σs2/σtd2; MF was defined as the ratio 
σs2/σtm2.  We then computed various statistical measures from these responses.  Stimulus-
choice correspondence index (SCCI) was computed as the difference between the mean 
measured response during FA trials and that during Miss trials.  Choice probability (CP) 
was the area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve applied to the 
distributions of responses belonging to ‘choose target-present’ and ‘choose target-absent’ 
after the mean response was removed from target-present trials.  Neural sensitivity (NS) 
was the area under the ROC curve applied to the distributions of responses belonging to 
‘target-present’ and ‘target-absent’ trials. 
In order to obtain the curves in Fig. 2.4, we used the following.  Our quantity of 
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where  is the ratio of standard normal pdf to cdf.  To compute choice 
probability (CP), let and  denote the pdfs of and , 
respectively, which are given by (Eq. 2.1) but normalized to sum to 1 by dividing by 
.  The cdfs and are given by a bivariate normal cdf as follows: 
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where and .  Similarly, 
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where and .  Choice probability is given by 
 




Neural sensitivity (NS) is given by 
 
  (2.6) 
 
Pooling algorithms 
To examine the dependency of our results on the spatial pooling model, we repeated our 
analysis for a diverse family of 9 alternative pooling rules.  Each rule was defined by a 
map of weights, and the pooled response on each trial was the dot product of that trial’s 
activity map with the pooling weights.  The choice-triggered pooling rule (used as our 
example pooling rule) had weights proportional to the 2-D Gaussian that best fit the 
average of all trials culminating in a “target-present” choice, minus the average of those 
culminating in a “target-absent” choice, after the stimulus-evoked response has been 
removed.  The stimulus-triggered pooling rule had weights proportional to the average 
‘target-present’ response, minus the average ‘target-absent’ response.  The next five 
pooling rules were defined by 2-dimensional Gaussians with σ = {0.5, 1, 2, 3, 4} mm 
respectively.  This range of parameters spanned the observed breadth of the fitted mean 
stimulus evoked response map, which had fit parameters σmajor = 1.71 mm, σminor = 1.36 
mm.  The remaining two pooling rules were defined by difference-of-Gaussian (DOG) 
weight maps.  These DOG’s included the weight map that optimally separates target-
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present from target-absent trials (Chen et al., 2006), as well as the DOG that optimally 




To examine the impact of our assumption that the subject and researcher share 
equal access to the sensory population (Fig. 2.2), we extended our Monte Carlo 
simulation to two dimensions.  The stimulus-evoked response was a two-dimensional 
Gaussian with peak amplitude of unity that matched the shape of the stimulus evoked 
response in the real experiments.  As in our real experiments, the stimulus appeared on 
50% of trials, and was added to spatially correlated Gaussian noise that occurred on all 
trials.  The spatial noise spectrum was matched to that measured in real experiments.  For 
each of the readout models we considered, the simulated subject and researcher each 
applied the model to these sensory signals, producing distributions of pooled sensory 
response amplitudes.  We normalized all pairs of distributions such that the target-absent 
distribution had a mean of zero, and the target-present distribution had a mean of one.  
We then added independent zero-mean Gaussian noise σd to the subject’s pooled sensory 
responses and independent zero-mean Gaussian noise σm to the researcher’s pooled 
sensory responses as in our earlier analysis. 
To explore the possibility of unequal access to V1 populations, we performed 
simulated experiments in which the researcher, the subject, or both, are given 
independent access only to a random sub-population of the simulated cortex (by setting 
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the pooling weights to zero in the inaccessible pixels).  We then observed the 
relationships between the estimated values of MF and DF under the model that assumed 
equal access (Fig. 2.2), and the actual values that were used to generate the simulation. 
Consider the case when the simulated experimenter is given access to 100% of the 
available cortical signals, while the simulated monkey samples a random subset, 
consisting of 70%, 80%, 90%, or 100% of the pixels (Fig. 2.7a-b).  Intuitively, as the 
number of noisy neurons/pixels contributing to the monkey’s pooled response decreases, 
the monkey’s signal-to-noise ratio decreases.  Because we normalize the pooled 
responses such that the mean target-absent response is equal to zero and the mean target-
present response is equal to unity, sub-sampling causes the monkey’s pooled variability 
to increase.  While this additional variability is inherited from the noisy neurons/pixels in 
our population and thus originates in sensory cortex, our model (which assumes that all 
noise in sensory cortex is shared; Fig. 2.2) considers any choice-related variability that is 
not measured as downstream noise.  Thus when the monkey sub-samples the sensory 
population, we expect our model to overestimate the amount of downstream noise, or in 
other words, underestimate DF.  Fig. 2.7a shows the relationship between the maximum 
likelihood estimate of DF and the actual DF value used to generate the simulated 
experiment.  The black line represents the case in which both the simulated experimenter 
and monkey each sample 100% of the available neurons, and thus our assumption of 
equal access is met.  The grey lines represent cases in which the simulated monkey sub-
samples the population.  This figure shows that as the monkey sub-samples the 
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population, the model systematically underestimates the true DF, consistent with our 
intuition. 
In contrast to its effect on DF, sub-sampling by the monkey has no effect on MF.  
Sub-sampling by the monkey should affect neither the simulated experimenter’s pooled 
sensory signals, nor the total measured variability, and thus the ratio MF should remain 
unchanged.  Fig. 2.7b, which shows the relationship between the maximum likelihood 
estimate of MF and the actual MF value used to generate the simulated experiment, 
verifies this intuition.  Cases in which the monkey sub-samples the population are not 
distinguishable from the case in which the monkey samples 100% of the available 
cortical signals. 
Next consider the case when the simulated monkey is given access to 100% of the 
available cortical signals, while the simulated experimenter samples a random subset, 
consisting of 70%, 80%, 90%, or 100% of the pixels (Fig. 2.7c-d).  We expect these cases 
to show symmetrical results to those described above.  On one hand, sub-sampling by the 
experimenter has no effect on the model’s estimate of DF (Fig. 2.7c), since this sub-
sampling affects neither the monkey’s pooled signals nor the total decision-related 
variability.  However, as the experimenter samples fewer pixels, the experimenter’s SNR 
decreases, and as above, this loss in SNR manifests as additional noise.  While this noise 
is sensory in origin, our model considers it as measurement noise.  Thus in the case when 
the experimenter sub-samples the population, we expect our model to overestimate 
measurement noise, or in other words, underestimate MF.  Fig. 2.7d illustrates that in 
these cases, the model systematically underestimates MF.   
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Finally, we considered cases in which both the simulated experimenter and 
monkey each sample a subset of the sensory cortical signals (Fig. 2.7e-f).  Because sub-
sampling by the experimenter has no effect on DF, differences between the estimated and 
actual DF values in these cases should be related to only the monkey’s sub-sampling.  
Fig. 2.7e shows the relationship between the actual and estimated DF when the 
experimenter samples just 50% of the available neurons and while the monkey samples 
70%, 80%, 90%, or 100% of the pixels.  This plot is identical to that of Fig. 2.7a, 
consistent with our intuition.  Similarly, we expect that differences between actual and 
estimated MF should be driven solely by the degree of sub-sampling by the experimenter.  
Fig. 2.7f shows the relationship between the actual and estimated MF when the monkey 
samples just 50% of the available neurons and while the experimenter samples 70%, 
80%, 90%, or 100% of the pixels.  This plot is identical to that of Fig. 2.7b, also 
consistent with our intuition. 
We repeated this analysis for seven of our nine pooling models (the two pooling 
models based on the real monkey’s choices are undefined in the simulation).  Results for 
the stimulus-triggered readout model are shown in Fig. 2.7, though our choice of readout 
model did not significantly affect our results. 
 
Eye movements 
To test whether small differences in eye movements may have been responsible 
for some of our results, we examined two eye movement statistics, which summarized the 
quality of fixation within each trial and across trials.  We have performed a similar 
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analysis previously (Chen et al., 2006).  The first statistic was the standard deviation of 
the eye position over the same time interval used for averaging of VSDI signals, and had 
a mean of 0.0894 degrees and a standard deviation of 0.0571 degrees.  The second 
statistic was the average distance from the monkey’s direction of gaze to the fixation 
point during this same time interval, and had a mean of 0.0547 degrees and standard 
deviation of 0.0115 across trials.  For each metric, we separated the data into two halves 
(above median and below median) and re-computed our DF and MF statistics for each 
half (see Table 2.4).  We then computed the bootstrapped sampling distributions of the 
difference between the two halves.  We repeated this procedure for each of our 9 readout 
models.  In no cases were any of the differences significantly different from zero at the 
0.05 level. In addition, we examined the population activity maps obtained from each half 
of the data, for each fixation quality metric.  For each half, we obtained bootstrapped 
sampling distributions of the parameters of the 2-dimensional Gaussian that best fit the 
evoked response to target-present trials.  Neither metric revealed any significant 
differences in the amplitude, location, or spatial spread of the evoked response.  A 
significant fraction of the variability in measured eye movements is likely due to 
variability introduced by the eye tracking device. 
 
Other notes 
All statistical tests on the behavioral data, physiological data, and Monte Carlo 





We trained two monkeys to perform a simple reaction-time visual detection task 
(Fig. 2.1).  The monkey began each trial by directing gaze to a central fixation point.  To 
obtain a reward, the monkey had to rapidly shift gaze to a small peripheral target during 
‘target-present’ trials (50% of trials), or to maintain fixation on the central fixation point 
during ‘target-absent’ trials (the remaining trials).  We used a small Gabor patch stimulus 
(sinusoidal grating in a 2-D Gaussian envelope) to effectively drive V1 cells, and 
presented the stimulus at one or two contrast levels near each monkey’s perceptual 
detection threshold to maintain task difficulty.  Target present trials were classified as 
‘Hits’ if the monkey correctly detected the target and ‘Misses’ otherwise. Target absent 
trials we classified as ‘False Alarms’ (FA) if the monkey reported seeing a target and 
‘Correct Rejections’ (CR) otherwise.  Monkeys T and C performed at 76% and 69% 
accuracy, respectively (see Table 2.1 for details regarding behavioral performance.) 
While the monkeys performed the task, we used voltage-sensitive dye imaging 
(VSDI) to measure population responses from V1, an area likely to play a central role in 
performance of such tasks.  VSDI measures changes in membrane potential from large 
populations of neurons in layers 1-3 (Chen et al., 2012; Petersen et al., 2003).  Previous 
work showed that this technique can be sufficiently sensitive to outperform monkeys in a 
similar detection task when combining single-trial VSDI signals optimally (Chen et al., 
2006; Chen et al., 2008).  Furthermore, because V1 contains a topographic map of visual 
space, the target activates only a limited region in V1 (Chen et al., 2006; Sit et al., 2009), 
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and this region can be entirely captured by VSDI.  Thus, VSDI may be capable of 





Figure 2.1.  Visual detection task and simultaneous VSDI recording.  Each trial begins when 
the subject locates and fixates a central fixation point.  After a 500 ms delay during which the 
subject is required to maintain fixation, the fixation point undergoes a slight increase in 
luminance to indicate the start of the task portion of the trial.  Following a 300 ms delay, a Gabor 
stimulus appears on 50% of trials.  The subject is required to make a saccadic eye movement to 
the stimulus location when it appears, or to maintain fixation on the central fixation point for an 
additional 900 ms when it does not appear.  The subject receives a drop of juice or water 
following correct choices, and no reward following incorrect choices.  Inset, cranial window 
above dorsal portions of primary visual cortex.  Black square indicates VSDI imaging area of 10 
x 10 mm2 in the left hemisphere.  Letters indicate approximate cortex orientation (A – anterior; P 





Table 2.1.  Summary of behavioral performance.  ‘Example experiment’ (from Monkey T) 
corresponds to data shown in Fig. 2.5a-c; ‘Combined’ data corresponds to data shown in Fig. 




Our goal here is to quantify the trial-to-trial co-variations between VSDI 
responses and the monkey’s choices, and use this co-variation to estimate the fraction of 
choice-related variability present in V1.  A common way to conceptualize the decision 
process in perceptual tasks is to assume that on each trial the subject computes a decision 
variable (a scalar) by combining responses from a population of sensory neurons during 
stimulus presentation.  The decision variable is then compared to a criterion to determine 
the behavioral choice on that trial (Green and Swets, 1966). 
Here we followed a similar approach.  In each trial we combined the VSDI 
responses over space and time using several pooling algorithms (discussed below) to 
obtain a single number that represents the pooled sensory response in that trial.  The trial-
to-trial variability in this pooled signal is assumed to be correlated with the decision 
variable.  We then developed a simple computational model that allowed us to explore 
the relationship between pooled sensory responses, downstream variability, and measured 
variability that is choice-unrelated. 
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Our model of the subject’s decision process begins when a binary signal is 
presented to the subject.  The subject encodes the signal (0 representing target absent, or 
1 representing target present), and adds Gaussian sensory variability to this 
representation, forming a pair of unitless Gaussian distributions with means {0,1} and 
variance σs2 (Fig. 2.2, ‘Sensory Encoding’).  During the formation of the decision, 
additional independent Gaussian decision-related variability with variance σd2 is added to 
the sensory representation (Fig. 2.2, ‘Downstream Variability’).  The total decision 
variability, which controls the subject’s accuracy, is the sum of the sensory variability 
and the downstream variability, σtd2 = σs2 + σd2.  The subject reports “target present” if 




Figure 2.2.  Theoretical framework.  Model of a subject’s formation of a binary decision and a 
researcher’s measurement of neuronal responses.  Stimulus-related information is encoded in an 
early sensory area as a pair of distributions with means {0,1} and variance σs2 (green), to which 
zero-mean noise with variance σd2 representing downstream variability is added (blue) to form 
the decision variable.  The subject compares the decision variable to a criterion to form a 
decision on each trial.  The upper portion of this panel represents stages in a researcher’s 
measurement, in which zero-mean measurement noise with variance σm2 (yellow) is added to the 
sensory representation to form the measured signals.  The measured signals are then analyzed 





As experimenters we have access to the sensory neural responses (Fig. 2.2, 
‘Sensory Encoding’), but we assume that our measurements are contaminated by 
independent, Gaussian measurement noise with variance σm2 (Fig. 2.2, ‘Measurement 
Noise’).  The total measured variability thus includes both the sensory variability and the 
measurement noise, σtm2 = σs2 + σm2. 
Our main goal is to estimate, given the measured neural responses and observed 
behavioral choices, the fraction of the total decision-related variability that is present in 
the sensory area, σs2/σtd2, which we abbreviate DF (‘decision fraction’).  While DF 
quantifies the percentage of the decision-limiting variability present in sensory cortex, it 
does not by itself reveal the origins of this variability; such variability may arise from 
stochastic activity of sensory neurons and it may also arise from top-down signals from 
higher cortical areas that affect the decision.  A second quantity of interest is the fraction 
of measured variability that is sensory, σs2/σtm2, which we abbreviate MF (‘measurement 
fraction’).  Under the model’s assumptions, we can use maximum likelihood to estimate 
DF and MF from our neural and behavioral data (see Eq. 2.1 in Methods).  The initial 
assumption in our model (Fig. 2.2) is that the experimenter and subject have access to 
exactly the same sensory neural signals. We later show that in cases in which the 
experimenter and subject use only partially overlapping neural signals, our model can 
only underestimate the true values of DF and MF. 
To obtain an intuition regarding the interplay between the model’s parameters and 
variables of interest, we performed a series of simulated experiments.  In these 
simulations we fixed the decision criterion and the total decision-related variability σtd2 to 
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values that reproduced the average behavioral accuracy of our monkeys (75%) and the 
observed distribution of errors (see Table 2.1).  We then systematically varied DF from 
0% to 100% (by varying σs2 from 0 to σtd2). 
We next examine how DF influences various measured quantities.  Consider first 
the possibility that most of the subject’s choice-related variability resides in our early 
sensory area, and thus little variability resides downstream (Fig. 2.3a).  In the absence of 
any measurement noise and under the assumption that we capture all of the sensory 
signals, our measured signals in both target-absent (red) and target-present (green) trials 
are highly correlated with the decision variable.  In the decision variable, by definition, 
neural responses in FA trials exceed the criterion while responses in Miss trials fall below 
the criterion, and thus the mean neuronal response associated with FA trials must exceed 
that of Miss trials.  Because the measured responses are highly correlated with the 
decision variable, the mean measured neuronal response associated with FA trials (Fig. 
2.3a, dashed red arrow) also exceeds that of Miss trials (dashed green arrow).  On the 
other hand, when the majority of the choice-related variability occurs downstream (Fig. 
2.3c), the sign of the difference between the mean FA and Miss responses is reversed.  In 
the absence of significant amounts of sensory variability (i.e., ), the sensory 
distributions approach deterministic signals; in this case the neuronal activity associated 
with FA trials is nearly identical to that of all target-absent trials (at a value near zero), 
and similarly, the activity associated with Miss trials is nearly identical to that of all 
target-present trials (unity).  Thus the difference between the mean neuronal responses 
associated with the two types of error trials, , is a useful proxy for the fraction 
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of choice-related variability present in the sensory area.  This difference reflects whether 
the responses in error trials correspond more closely with the stimulus or with the choice, 
and thus we introduce the term ‘stimulus-choice correspondence index’ (SCCI) for its 
quantity.  Importantly, our model and metric generalize to other types of binary decision 
tasks (see Discussion). SCCI has a linear relationship with DF (Fig. 2.3e; Eq. 2.2); it 
reaches its maximum value, which depends on the subject’s behavioral performance, 
when DF = 1, and its minimum value of -1 when DF = 0.  Under our model’s 
assumptions and given the monkey’s behavioral performance, positive values of the 
SCCI metric (Fig. 2.3a,b) would imply that more than 55% of the choice-related 
variability is present in our VSDI recordings and thus resides in V1. 
Importantly, SCCI is unaffected by the addition of choice-unrelated variability.  
To illustrate this property, Fig. 2.3d shows the same pair of distributions given in Fig. 
2.3a after the addition of a large amount of measurement noise.  This additional, zero-
mean noise does not bias the mean responses tied to each of the 4 behavioral outcomes, 
and thus does not affect SCCI.  The insensitivity of SCCI to the presence of measurement 
noise makes this metric advantageous over other metrics of choice-related activity such 
as choice probability (Britten et al., 1996) (CP).  CP measures the discriminability of two 
distributions of neuronal responses that belong to the same stimulus condition but to two  
different behavioral choices, such as ‘Hits’ (solid green line) and ‘Misses’ (dashed green 
line).  It ranges from 0.5 (no discriminability) to 1 (perfect discriminability).  Fig. 2.3a-c 
shows that CP is also related to DF.  However, comparison of Fig. 2.3a and d shows that 




Figure 2.3.  Expected relationship between observable quantities and the underlying 
properties of a decision.  a-d (lower), Joint distributions of the decision variable (ordinates) and 
model-predicted neuronal responses (abscissae) under 4 noise scenarios, ranging from 85% of 
choice-related variability occurring in a measured brain area (a) to only 5% of choice-related 
variability captured by the measurement and the remaining 95% occurring downstream (c).  In 
panels a-d, marginal distributions are shown for ‘Hit’ (solid green), ‘Miss’ (dashed green), ‘False 
Alarm’ (dashed red), and ‘Correct Rejection’ (solid red) trials.  The marginal distributions of the 
ordinate of panel a represent the decision variable.  Red and green arrows indicate mean 
neuronal response amplitude for each of the 4 behavioral categories.  Black arrows and 
horizontal black lines indicate the decision criterion.  Stimulus-choice correspondence index 
(SCCI), and choice probability (CP) values (see text for details) are reported for each scenario.  
In panels a-c, no choice-unrelated variability was added to the measured responses (i.e., MF = 1).  
d, Same as panel a, after adding a large amount of choice-unrelated variability.  e, Relationship 
between SCCI (left ordinate), CP (right ordinate), and DF.  Blue lines indicate maximum-
likelihood estimated DF solutions (see Methods) and their corresponding SCCI values for the 
choice-triggered pooling rule (dotted blue line) and each of 8 alternative pooling rules (solid blue 
lines).  f, The relationship between SCCI (left ordinate), CP (right ordinate),  and MF when DF = 
0.85.  While SCCI is independent of MF, CP varies systematically with MF.  
 
 
2.3f (see also Fig. 2.4).  Thus while both CP and SCCI are potential indicators of the 
fraction of choice-related variability captured by the measurement, SCCI has the 
advantage that it is robust to choice-unrelated variability. 
Finally, we examined the behavior of neural sensitivity (Newsome et al., 1989) 
(NS), which is defined as the discriminability between two distributions of measured 
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neuronal responses for two stimulus conditions, in our case ‘target present’ vs. ‘target 
absent’.  Intuitively, when most of the choice-related variability resides in sensory cortex 
(Fig. 2.3a), the pooled sensory variability will be large and therefore NS will be weak.  
As the percentage of downstream variability increases and behavior becomes limited 
primarily by downstream noise (Fig. 2.3c), the measured NS (which captures the 
sensitivity of the measured sensory signals prior to contamination by downstream noise) 
approaches unity (Fig. 2.4c). Having established a general computational framework for 
studying the relationship between noisy measures of neural population responses and 
choice, our next step was to examine our physiological results. 
 
Physiological results 
Results from a representative VSDI experiment (Fig. 2.5a-c) reveal robust choice-
related modulations at the level of neural populations in V1.  Fig. 2.5a shows the spatial 
spread of activation during stimulus-present and stimulus-absent trials.  On average, the 
stimulus evoked a broad Gaussian-shaped response across the population of neurons in 
comparison to the stimulus-absent trials, consistent with our previous results (Chen et al., 
2006; Chen et al., 2008; Chen and Seidemann, 2012; Sit et al., 2009).  The mean 
stimulus-present and -absent maps were each further partitioned into mean Hit and Miss 
maps, and mean FA and CR maps, respectively.  These maps reveal strong choice-related 
differences.  Responses in Hit trials are strong while responses in Miss trials are 
extremely weak even though the same visual target was presented in all of these trials.  
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Similarly, the responses in FA trials are large and widespread even though no visual 





Figure 2.4.  Expected SCCI, choice probability, and neural sensitivity as functions of DF 
and MF.  a-c, SCCI, CP, and NS metrics as functions of DF when MF = 1 (i.e., in the absence of 
choice-unrelated variability).  d-f, SCCI, CP, and NS metrics as functions of MF when DF = 
0.85 (i.e., the DF inferred from the real data when applying the choice-triggered pooling rule).  
Dashed blue lines indicate values estimated using the choice-triggered pooling model described 






Figure 2.5.  VSDI sensory population recordings.  a-c, Example VSDI experiment in Monkey 
T.  a, Average cortical activity maps separated by stimulus condition (rows) and behavioral 
choice (columns), and averaged over a 100 ms temporal window (see Methods for details).   
Upper row of panel a represents neural activity during target-present trials; lower row shows 
activity during target-absent trials.  Activity maps are shown separately for ‘choose target-
present’ (H and FA) and ‘choose target-absent’ (M and CR) trials.  ‘H-M’, difference map of 
activity during Hit and Miss trials.  ‘FA-CR’, difference map of activity during FA and CR trials.  
Cortical maps represent activity averaged over the time interval indicated by the horizontal black 
bar in c.  b, Histogram of pooled population responses for each of the 4 behavioral categories:  
Hit (solid green), Miss (dashed green), False Alarm (dashed red), and Correct Rejection (solid 
red).  Arrows indicate mean population response for each category.  Scalar response amplitudes 
were generated by pooling cortical activity with the choice-triggered decoder (see text for 
details).  c, Time evolution of mean neuronal population response for each of the 4 behavioral 
categories.  Shaded areas indicate standard errors.  Hash marks at the bottom of the panel 
indicate saccadic onset times in Hit (green) and FA (red) trials.  The left side of panel c shows 
responses aligned to stimulus onset; the right side of panel c shows responses aligned to saccadic 
eye movements.  In the right side of panel c, traces for trials in which the monkey did not make 
an eye movement (Miss and CR trials) are shown for intervals re-sampled from those of the Hit 
and FA trials.  DF and MF values obtained by averaging VSDI responses over the saccade-
aligned intervals showed results qualitatively similar to those obtained over the stimulus-aligned 
intervals (see Table 2.3 for quantitative comparison).  d-f, Aggregate summary of VSDI results 
collapsed over 13 experiments in Monkey T and 2 experiments in Monkey C.  Same 




Examination of the population activity maps reveals two key results.  First, 
choice-related activity, as revealed by the Hit-Miss and FA-CR difference maps, is 
distributed broadly across the neuronal population rather than being restricted to a small 
region.  Second, comparison of the FA and Miss maps reveals greater activity on FA 
trials than on Miss trials, suggesting that the population activity in V1 corresponds more 
closely in this task to the subject’s choice than to the stimulus.  The strong activity during 
FA trials extends across a large region of sensory cortex and the activity during Miss 
trials remains weak across the population, suggesting that our SCCI metric will take on 
positive values across a wide range of potential spatial pooling algorithms. 
The two key findings from the example experiment hold in our combined data set 
(Fig. 2.5d-f).  Because the results from the two monkeys were qualitatively similar (see 
Fig. 2.6), 13 experiments from Monkey T and 2 experiments from Monkey C were 
combined to produce our aggregate results.  Fig. 2.5d shows robust choice-related 
activity that is broadly distributed, and FA responses that exceed Miss responses, 
suggesting that in our task, most choice-related activity may reside in V1. 
To estimate the fraction of choice-related variability captured by our VSDI 
measurements, we combined the signals over cortical space and time into a single value 
for each trial, and examined the distribution of these scalar responses across trials (see 
Methods).  Neural responses at each location were averaged over a short temporal 
interval (see Methods).  Here, in order to combine the population signals over space, we 
used a simple choice-triggered pooling rule with weights proportional to the 2-D 




Figure 2.6.  VSDI sensory population recordings in the two monkeys.  a-c, Average 
of 13 experiments in Monkey T.  d-f, Average of 2 experiments in Monkey C.  Same 
conventions as in Fig. 2.4. 
 
 
minus the average of those culminating in a “target-absent” choice, after the stimulus-
evoked response has been removed; we consider additional pooling rules later on.  The 
resulting values are plotted in the histogram of Fig. 2.5e.  This panel shows that the mean 
FA response exceeds the mean Miss response (SCCI = 0.53).  According to our model, 
our combined SCCI value of 0.53 corresponds to DF = 0.85 (95% CI: [0.48 1.00]) (Fig. 
2.3e, dashed blue line), or in other words, 85% of the choice-related variability is present 
in V1. 
Our model also allows us to estimate the fraction of the total measured variability 
that is choice-related (MF).  Given our result that DF = 0.85, if there is no measurement 
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noise, the model predicts high CP (0.96) and NS (0.87).  Our observed CP (0.55), while 
significantly above 0.5 (p<0.01), is much lower than the predicted value.  Similarly, our 
observed NS (0.56), while significantly above 0.5 (p<0.01), is much lower than the 
predicted value.  The observed NS and CP values are therefore consistent with very large 
amounts of measurements noise (MF = 0.02).  In other words, our results show that in the 
current set of experiments, the vast majority of the measured variability is choice-
unrelated (see Discussion for comparison with previous results). 
To determine whether our results depend on the particular choice of the spatial 
pooling model, we repeated our analysis using a diverse family of alternative pooling 
models.  We considered a stimulus-triggered pooling rule with weights proportional to 
the mean stimulus-evoked response.  We also tested pooling rules based on 2-D 
Gaussians and differences-of-Gaussians (DOGs), such as the optimal decoder derived 
previously in our lab (Chen et al., 2006) (see Methods).  Fig. 2.3e (solid blue lines) shows 
the SCCI and corresponding DF value obtained for each of the pooling models we 
considered; DF varied slightly by model, with most models producing a value near 0.84, 
but no model produced a value less than 0.81.  Table 2.2 shows the DF and MF values 
obtained for each of the 9 pooling rules, shown separately for the example experiment, 
each monkey, and the combined data.  These results suggest that over a broad family of 
plausible pooling algorithms, our estimate of the fraction of choice-related variability 
captured by our measurements is at least 81%.  In addition, to determine whether our 
results depended on the temporal interval over which we averaged the neural population 
activity, we repeated the analysis separately for responses obtained by averaging over 
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temporal intervals aligned to the stimulus and to the behavioral response.  Table 2.3 
shows that the results obtained during the saccade-aligned interval supports our main 




Table 2.2.  DF and MF solutions for each of 9 pooling rules.  DF and MF values are 
shown for the example experiment, each of the two monkeys separately, and the 





Table 2.3.  DF and MF solutions for each of 9 pooling rules, obtained separately for 
temporal averaging intervals aligned to the stimulus and to the choice.  To obtain 
data for the Miss and Correct Rejection trials during the saccade-aligned interval, 








As discussed above, our model (Fig. 2.2) assumes that the subject and researcher 
share equal access to the V1 population.  However in a real experiment, population 
measures such as VSDI are limited to a finite spatial extent, spatial resolution, and 
cortical depth.  Thus the subject and researcher’s pooled sensory responses may overlap 
only partially.  To explore the possible impact of partial overlap, we extended our model 
by simulating V1 as a 2-dimensional patch of neurons/pixels with signal and noise 
characteristics that matched those from the real data (see Methods).  We then performed 
simulated experiments in which the researcher, the subject, or both, are given 
independent access only to a random sub-population of the simulated cortex.  Our results 
(Fig. 2.7) show that in these cases, a portion of the choice-related sensory variability may 
be un-captured by the experimenter, and likewise, a portion of the measured neural 
variability may be unrelated to choice.  Because our model considers any choice-related 
variability that is not measured as downstream noise, the model’s estimate of the 
downstream noise is an upper bound on the actual downstream noise.  In other words, 
because some of what our model considers as downstream noise may actually reside in 
V1, the DF estimated by our model is a lower bound on the true fraction of choice-related 
variability present in sensory cortex.  Similarly, because our model considers any 
measured variability that is choice unrelated as measurement noise, the model’s estimate 






Figure 2.7.  Sub-sampling analysis.  Relationships between DF and MF values inferred using 
the maximum likelihood method (ordinates) and those used to generate the simulation 
(abscissae) during conditions in which the simulated monkey sub-samples the cortical population 
(a,b), the simulated experimenter sub-samples (c,d), and both the simulated monkey and 
experimenter sub-sample (e,f).  Black lines in a-d correspond to the case in which our initial 
assumption of equal access is met (see text for details).  Grey lines indicate the percentage of 
pixels sampled.  This figure demonstrates that the DF and MF values inferred with the maximum 





Small differences in eye movements could have been responsible for some of our 
results.  For example, it is possible that a systematic relationship between direction of 
gaze and behavioral choice could lead to a spurious correlation between cortical activity 
and choice.  To rule out this possibility, we applied 2 tests of eye movement statistics 
(Table 2.4; see also Methods), and for each statistic, we re-ran the analysis for the half of 
trials with the best fixation and compared the results to those from the half with the 
poorest fixation.  None of the differences we observed were significant, suggesting that 




Table 2.4.  Eye movement controls.  2-D Gaussian fit parameters of the stimulus-evoked 
response, obtained separately for the best and worst half of fixation, across two measures of 
fixation quality (see Methods).  None of the differences in amplitude, location, or spread, for 
either statistic, were significant at the 0.05 level, suggesting that small differences in eye 




Here we present two main findings.  First, in a visual detection task, choice-
related activity is distributed across tens of mm2 of sensory cortex (Figs. 2.5; 2.6).  This 
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finding suggests that subjects combine sensory signals from a broad region of cortical 
space in order to inform decisions.  Second, the sensory population responses we 
measured correspond more closely to the subject’s choices than to the stimulus.  This 
result was captured by a new metric, ‘stimulus-choice correspondence index’ (SCCI), 
which is directly related to the fraction of choice-related variability present in sensory 
cortex and is invariant to choice-unrelated variability.  We developed a general 
computational model for studying the relation between choice-related activity and noisy 
measures of neural population responses.  Using this model, we find that V1 population 
responses account for the majority of the subjects’ choice-related neural variability.  This 
finding suggests that perceptual performance is limited primarily by the quality of the 
sensory evidence gleaned by the subject from sensory cortex, and only secondarily 
limited by downstream noise. 
Our finding that choice-related information is distributed broadly across sensory 
cortex is consistent with previous reports of weak single-neuron choice probabilities 
(Britten et al., 1996; Celebrini and Newsome, 1994; Cook and Maunsell, 2002; de 
Lafuente and Romo, 2005; Dodd et al., 2001; Nienborg and Cumming, 2006; Nienborg 
and Cumming, 2009; Palmer et al., 2007; Purushothaman and Bradley, 2005; Uka and 
DeAngelis, 2004) in the presence of weak inter-neuronal correlations (e.g., Zohary et al., 
1994).  If these neurons were statistically independent, choice-related activity in a single 
neuron should be immeasurably small (Shadlen et al., 1996).  However, the presence of 
weak inter-neuronal correlations causes single-neurons to be weakly correlated with the 




Figure 2.8.  Spatial correlations as a function of cortical distance.  Pixel-to-pixel correlation 
coefficients computed across all pairs of pixels, plotted as a function of cortical distance.  Blue, 
target-present trials; black, target-absent trials.  Shaded areas indicated 95% confidence intervals 
(bootstrapped).  The spatial correlation profiles during target-present and -absent trials are 
statistically indistinguishable at all cortical distances tested. 
 
 
measure significant CP in individual cells.   Thus, while subjects are likely to pool 
broadly from sensory cortex to inform decisions, weak inter-neuronal correlations may 
have enabled previous studies to find weak correlations between the activity of single-
neurons and behavior. 
Our result that the sensory population signals correspond more closely to the 
subject’s choices than to the stimulus is similar to findings reported previously in human 
V1 by fMRI (Ress and Heeger, 2003).  Our results go beyond these earlier findings.  
First, in contrast to the slow and indirect nature of the fMRI signal, VSDI allowed us to 
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directly measure the spatiotemporal dynamics of these choice-related electrical signals in 
V1. In addition, by combining our results with a simple computational model, we show 
that most choice-related variability is present in early sensory cortex.  
That variability in behavior can be explained largely by variability in sensory 
encoding is consistent with the conclusion of a previous study, which compared the 
fidelity of pursuit eye movements in humans with the limits of motion perception inferred 
by analysis of neural responses in macaque MT (Osborne et al., 2005).  Here we use the 
direct trial-by-trial relationship between sensory population responses and choice within 
the same subjects to show that variability in perceptual decisions is dominated by 
variability in sensory cortex.  
The observed co-variation between V1 population activity and behavioral choice 
may be due to feed-forward (bottom-up) sensory noise.  It may also be due to a feedback 
(top-down) mechanism, whereby signals from higher brain areas influence the neural 
activity of V1 (e.g., Nienborg and Cumming, 2009).  The latter type of signal could be 
primarily post-decisional, where the decision propagates to and influences V1.  It may 
also contain a pre-decisional component, where top-down signals alter V1 circuits in 
advance of the trial, influencing the stimulus-evoked response as it arrives.  To address 
these possibilities, we examined the time evolution of the choice-related signals (Figs. 
2.5c,f; 2.6c,f).  Because stimulus contrast was very low, the target-evoked response is 
delayed and builds up slowly (Chen et al., 2008). In both target-present (green traces) and 
target-absent trials (red traces), the mean population response begins to show choice-
related differences around the time of the onset of the stimulus-evoked response, and the 
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differences increase steadily throughout the trial.  The near correspondence between the 
onset and dynamics of the choice-related signals and that of the stimulus-evoked response 
provides evidence against a post-decisional top-down mechanism in which we would 
expect the choice-related signals to manifest only well after the evoked response.  
However, we cannot rule out the possibility that the choice-related signals we observe are 
the result of a pre-decisional attention-like signal. This possibility is nevertheless 
somewhat unlikely for two reasons.  First, in a recent study in which we directly 
examined the effects of spatial attention in V1 in a similar detection task, we observed 
attentional effects that occurred shortly before stimulus onset and spread over a larger 
spatial extent than the stimulus evoked response (Chen and Seidemann, 2012),  
inconsistent with the choice-related responses observed here (Figs. 2.5; 2.6).  Second, 
because the stimulus sequence in our task was random, top-down signals that bias the 
subject’s behavior prior to stimulus onset would only be detrimental to task performance.  
Since our results were collected in highly trained subjects, the impact of such a biasing 
signal in our results is likely to be minimal.  
Our study speaks to fundamental questions about the relationship between noisy 
sensory representations and perceptual decisions.  Here we show that decision-related 
neural activity is distributed broadly in early sensory cortex.  This finding suggests that 
subjects pool information over a large population of sensory neurons to inform decisions, 
rather than relying on a small group of highly informative neurons.  Second, we provide 
evidence that most of the choice-related neural variability is already present in early 
sensory cortex, suggesting that downstream circuits add little variability that affects 
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decisions.  An important goal for future studies is to determine the extent to which these 
results hold in other visual perceptual tasks and in other sensory modalities. 
 
Applicability of our model to other binary decision tasks 
Our model and metric are not restricted to “yes/no” detection tasks but generalize 
to other types of binary decision tasks.  For example, consider the relationship between 
our detection task and the ubiquitous motion direction discrimination task (e.g., 
Newsome et al., 1989).  In each case, the subject must make a binary decision about a 
sensory stimulus while responses are collected from neurons that are sensitive to the 
stimulus presented.  In direction discrimination, the subject is presented with a field of 
moving dots.  A fraction of the dots move coherently in one direction while the remaining 
dots exhibit random motion.  The fraction of dots that move coherently is the 
‘coherence’, where lower coherence trials are more difficult to discriminate.  Consider a 
case in which an experimenter identifies a population of neurons with a preferred 
direction of motion, and makes repeated measurements of their responses to a near-
threshold low-coherence stimulus moving in the preferred direction (‘preferred’; e.g., 
leftward motion) and in the opposite (‘null’; e.g., rightward motion) direction; the subject 
must choose “leftward” or “rightward” in an attempt to correctly indicate the direction of 
motion presented.  The collection of pooled responses to a single coherence and two 
different directions forms a pair of distributions, analogous to our pair of neural response 
distributions for target-present and target-absent trials, respectively.  The experimenter 
may then normalize these distributions by subtracting from all responses the mean of the 
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responses belonging to the ‘null’ stimulus distribution, then dividing all responses by the 
mean of the responses belonging to the ‘preferred’ stimulus distribution.  While direction 
discrimination is a one-interval 2-alternative forced choice task yielding just two possible 
outcomes (correct and incorrect choices), one may nevertheless identify two distinct 
distributions of pooled neural responses belonging to incorrect choices.  The first 
distribution is the collection of pooled neural responses to stimuli in the ‘null’ direction in 
trials in which the subject chose “preferred” (analogous to our FA trials), and the second 
distribution is the collection of pooled neural responses to stimuli in the ‘preferred’ 
direction in trials in which the subject chose “null” (analogous to our Miss trials).  The 
SCCI in this task may be defined as the difference between the mean of the former 
distribution and the mean of the latter distribution.  As in our experiments, the SCCI 
quantifies the extent to which responses from this neural population correspond more 
closely, on average, to the stimulus or to the choice.  Under the assumption that these 
pooled neural responses come from Gaussian, equal variance distributions, the 
experimenter can use maximum likelihood to estimate the model parameters 
(see Eq. 2.1). 
 
Relationship with previous studies of neural sensitivity 
Our findings that the vast majority of measured variability is choice-unrelated and 
that the observed neural sensitivity is relatively weak are seemingly at odds with results 
from a previous study which showed that the VSDI responses in V1 are sufficiently 
sensitive to outperform the monkey in a similar detection task (Chen et al., 2006; Chen et 
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al., 2008).  The most likely explanation for this discrepancy is that the strength of the 
average VSDI response can vary significantly across animals.  The previous studies 
included for analysis only those experiments in which the responses to the high-contrast 
stimulus (25%-contrast Gabor) showed high signal-to-noise ratio (d’ ≥ 3), whereas the 
current study considers experiments in which the responses to the 25%-contrast Gabor 
showed lower SNR (d’ ≥ 1).  The responses to low contrast stimuli in the current 
experiment are also much weaker than those in the previous study, while the total 
measured variability is comparable between the two studies.  Because we normalize our 
responses such that the mean target-absent response is zero and the mean target-present 
response is unity, this weaker response manifests as additional choice-unrelated noise, 
which may explain why the MF value we report is so low.  Importantly, the estimated DF 
value we obtain here is independent of this choice-unrelated variability, and can be 
accurately quantified provided we have sufficient data to estimate the mean neural 
response from each outcome category.  An additional possible source for the discrepancy 
between the results of the two studies is that the two tasks were not identical.  In the Chen 
et al. studies, monkeys were required to detect Gabor stimuli over a broad range of 
randomly intermixed contrasts (including contrasts well above psychophysical threshold), 
while in the current study, the monkeys were required to detect Gabor stimuli at just one 
or two contrast levels (always near psychophysical threshold).  Unfortunately, a direct 
comparison between the two studies cannot be made because the previous study did not 








In Chapter 2, I showed that when monkeys perform a simple visual detection task, 
choice-related variability is distributed broadly across early sensory cortex, and that the 
majority of the choice-related variability is already present in the earliest stages of visual 
cortical processing.  While this primary sensory neural variation could account for most 
of the monkey’s task inefficiency, the quantitative contributions of the various stages in 
the formation of a perceptual decision to the subject’s overall task inefficiency are 
unknown:  variability at the level of the decision variable could occur because of sensory 
variability that is unavoidable, sub-optimal decoding of sensory signals, and additional 
neural variability introduced downstream from sensory cortex.  Here we use a 
combination of direct measurement of neural population responses in primary visual 
cortex (V1) by voltage-sensitive dye imaging and a simple computational model to 
identify a family of possible decoding algorithms likely used by the monkey in our task, 
and use this result to estimate the relative contributions of these potential sources of 
inefficiency to the monkey’s overall inefficiency.  Two key features of our data suggest 
that the monkey does not employ a linear pooling rule.  First, the spatial spread of 
activation in choice-triggered maps during target-absent trials is approximately twice as 
broad as during target-present trials.  Second, we observed that the spatial spread of 
saccade endpoints during ‘False Alarm’ trials is approximately 41% broader than during 
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‘Hit’ trials.  These observations, together with a recent finding that human detection 
performance may be limited by intrinsic location uncertainty (Michel and Geisler, 2011), 
led us to consider pooling algorithms that incorporate spatial uncertainty.  Our data is 
consistent with the use of a decoding algorithm in which the monkey attempts to match a 
template of the evoked population response over a broad region of sensory cortex.  The 
template is likely to have a space constant less than that of the evoked response, while the 
search is likely to occur over an area broader than that of the evoked response.  In the 
second half of this study, we tested a family of such ‘intrinsic uncertainty decoders’ 
against the optimal rule for combining sensory population signals over cortical space.  
We found that the sub-optimality resulting from decoding the sensory signals with spatial 
uncertainty can explain a significant fraction of the overall inefficiency in task 
performance.  Overall, our results suggest that in a simple detection task, perceptual 
decisions may be limited substantially by intrinsic spatial uncertainty in decoding sensory 
signals, and to a lesser extent, by downstream variability. 
 
3.2 Introduction 
When an organism is faced with a challenging perceptual task, what limits 
behavioral performance?  I have previously shown (Chapter 2) that when monkeys 
perform a simple visual detection task, both stimulus-related signals and choice-related 
signals are distributed across a broad population of sensory neurons in primary visual 
cortex, and that the majority of the choice-related variability is already present in this 
earliest stage of visual cortical processing.  This result suggests that performance may be 
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limited primarily by variability that occurs in early sensory cortex.  However, decision-
related variability in early sensory cortex depends both on the fidelity with which the 
brain encodes stimuli across the sensory cortical population, as well as the brain’s 
efficiency in decoding these population signals.  Here we consider the extent to which 
decision-related variability in primary visual cortex in our task is due to unavoidable 
sensory variability, and the extent to which it is due to inefficiencies in decoding. 
 How the subject reads out, or decodes, the distributed sensory population signals 
in order to form a decision is unknown.  To address this question, we used an approach 
based on signal detection theory.  We assumed that on each trial, the subject combines 
responses from a population of sensory neurons during stimulus presentation to form a 
single number (the decision variable).  The monkey then compares the decision variable 
to a criterion to determine the behavioral choice on that trial (Green and Swets, 1966).  
Previous studies have proposed various pooling models to describe how populations of 
sensory neurons contribute to a perceptual decision (e.g., Shadlen et al., 1996).  However, 
the neural populations used to constrain such models are often, in practice, aggregates of 
the responses of individual neurons collected one by one. 
In contrast to single-neuron electrophysiology, methods for simultaneously 
measuring the responses of a large population of neurons, such as voltage-sensitive dye 
imaging (VSDI) (Grinvald and Hildesheim, 2004), can reveal how the spatial distribution 
of responses of sensory neurons co-varies with behavioral choice on a trial-by-trial basis, 
potentially providing stronger constraints on models of the population decoding process.  
For example, by comparing the spatial distribution of sensory activity during trials in 
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which the subject makes one behavioral choice with that during trials belonging to the 
alternative behavioral choice, one can potentially identify those neurons that are weighted 
more heavily in the decision process. 
To address the question of how subjects decode signals encoded across a sensory 
population, we used VSDI to record from a large population of neurons in primary visual 
cortex (V1) of two monkeys while they performed a difficult visual detection task.  We 
used key features of our data to constrain our search for a likely decoder and identified a 
family of plausible decoding algorithms.  To determine the extent to which performance 
is limited by inefficiencies in the decoding process, we compared the efficacy of these 
algorithms with that of the optimal decoding algorithm.  This approach allows us to 
determine whether post-sensory processing is primarily limited by sub-optimal decoding 
of sensory signals or by additional neural variability occurring downstream from the 
sensory decoding process. 
 
3.3 Materials and Methods 
The monkeys’ task, visual stimuli, VSDI recording and signal pre-processing are 
identical to those described in Chapter 2. 
 
Intrinsic Uncertainty Decoder 
Important features of our physiological and behavioral data suggested that 
subjects are uncertain about the precise location of the visual stimulus in our detection 
task (see Results for details).  To explore this possibility, we developed an intrinsic 
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uncertainty decoding algorithm, or a hypothesized mechanism by which subjects may 
attempt to perform the task despite their incomplete knowledge of the stimulus location.  
We developed a simple model of the decision process (Fig. 3.3) and carried out a series 
of simulations based on the model.  Our model is described in the Results section within 
a connectionist framework involving three hypothetical cortical layers.  Briefly, in this 
example framework the brain first encodes visual stimuli across a population of primary 
sensory cortical neurons.  Next, this sensory population sends convergent projections 
onto a second layer of cortex, where the brain attempts to match the population response 
to a remembered template.  Third, the template layer projects to a third layer via 
unequally weighted, parallel connections, allowing the brain to weight the likelihood that 
a potential match arose from the presence of a visual stimulus, based on the remembered 
location of that stimulus.  Finally, neurons of this third layer instantiate a winner-take-all-
like mechanism via lateral, inhibitory connections, which serve to identify the maximally 
responding neurons of this cortical layer, whose responses are taken to be the scalar 
decoded sensory response. 
We carried out the simulations by applying a sequence of equivalent 
mathematical operations.  We first simulated the encoding stage in V1 as a 2-dimensional 
patch of neurons/pixels with signal and noise characteristics consistent with those 
observed in the real data.  To decode these sensory signals, the simulated subject searches 
for a peak of activation in sensory cortex by convolving the population activity map on 
each trial with a 2-D Gaussian template (equivalent to Fig. 3.3b, ‘Template Matching’).  
We later extended our model by considering a template with weights proportional to the 
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difference-of-Gaussians (DOG) that optimally separates target-present trials from target-
absent trials in the absence of location uncertainty, and tested this template under varying 
amounts of location uncertainty.  Second, the subject weights potential match locations 
according to prior knowledge about the target location.  We simulated the subject’s 
knowledge of the target location as a 2-D Gaussian (Fig. 3.3b, ‘Uncertainty Weighting’) 
centered on the correct cortical location of the stimulus-evoked response.  The subject 
weighted the match locations by multiplying the output of the convolution operation in 
the first step by the Gaussian spatial uncertainty distribution.  Third, the simulated subject 
selected the pixel with the maximal response, and its value was taken to be the pooled 
sensory response.  We later generalized this stage such that it transforms the population 
activity into a scalar response via the p-norm operation.  The p-norm is defined as 
 
  (3.1) 
 
 
and is equivalent to the maximum operation when p = ∞.  We repeated our simulations 
for p = {1,2,3,4,5,10,100, ∞}.  Finally, we added independent, zero-mean Gaussian noise 
(Fig. 3.3a, ‘Downstream Noise’) to the pooled sensory response, producing the decision 
variable.  Trials for which the decision variable exceeded a criterion were classed as 
“choose target-present” trials; all other trials were “choose target-absent” trials.  The 
amount of downstream noise and the decision criterion were chosen such that the 
simulated monkey’s performance matched the real monkey’s percent correct and 
distribution of behavioral outcomes (see Chapter 2, Table 2.1 for details regarding 
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behavioral performance).  Finally, in order to evaluate the performance of the model, we 
computed choice-triggered maps by averaging the simulated V1 activity according to the 
simulated subject’s choices; we computed simulated eye movements by multiplying the 
cortical location of the maximally responding pixel on each trial by a cortical 
magnification factor based on the retinal location of the target in each monkey. 
In order to simulate the sensory encoding stage as a 2-dimensional patch of pixels 
with signal and noise characteristics consistent with those observed in the real data, we 
assumed that the total measured variability arose from two sources:  neural activity in V1 
and measurement noise.  Measurement noise in the VSDI recordings consists of camera 
sensor shot noise and mechanical fluctuations, as well as non-neural biological noise such 
as residual heartbeat and respiration artifacts.  The relative contributions of neural 
activity and measurement noise to the VSDI signal are unknown.  Because the statistics 
of interest we compute from our simulated data (see below) are based solely on averages, 
they are unaffected by the presence of zero-mean measurement noise (we performed 
additional simulations to verify that none of our statistics were affected); therefore we did 
not include measurement noise in our simulations.  However, these statistics depend on 
the degree to which the simulated neural V1 signals are correlated across space.  To 
address this concern, we performed preliminary simulations under six discrete 
assumptions about the spatial correlations in neural V1 signals.  We started by assuming 
that the measured correlations arose entirely from neural activity in V1.  Based on our 
empirical results, we also assumed that the variance is identical at each pixel, and that the 
spatial correlations are isotropic, depending only on cortical distance.  In subsequent 
98 
 
simulations, we modeled the neural variability in V1 with a white component and a 
correlated component, and we varied the ratio of these components such that the 
simulated neural noise comprised 0%, 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, or 100% of the total noise 
correlations observed in the VSDI signals.  In these preliminary simulations, when the 
correlated component of our simulated neural variability was large ( > 5%), we were 
unable to reproduce our result that the average spatial pattern of activity during False 
Alarm trials exceeds that of Miss trials.  Thus, the models presented in the Results section 
were carried out under the assumption that 5% of the observed correlations originated 
from neural activity in V1. 
Our model contains three free parameters:  the average variance of each 
neuron/pixel in V1, σV12; the breadth of the uncertainty template, σtemplate; and the breadth 
of the uncertainty window, σuncertainty.  For each pair of (σtemplate, σuncertainty), σV12 
determines the variability of the decoded (scalar) response, which can be expressed as a 
fraction of the total variability related to choice, DF (see Chapter 2).  We aimed to 
reproduce two key features of our data:  greater spread of activation of choice-triggered 
maps and greater spread in saccade endpoints during target-absent trials than during 
target-present trials.  Additionally, we aimed to reproduce our earlier key finding that FA 
trials show stronger activity than Miss trials (see Chapter 2). 
For each point in parameter space, we computed key statistics from the simulated 
data.  We first computed choice-triggered maps by averaging together the simulated V1 
responses belonging to Hit and Miss trials and taking their differences; we similarly 
averaged together responses belonging to False Alarm and Correct Rejection responses 
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and taking their difference.  We then fitted these target-present and target-absent choice-
triggered difference maps to a 2-dimensional Gaussian with a single parameter for the 
breadth of the activity in each stimulus condition, σH-M and σFA-CR, respectively, as well 
as an amplitude parameter and two location parameters.  The ratio of these widths, σFA-CR 
/ σH-M, was the choice-triggered map ratio (CTMR).  Next, we computed the saccade ratio 
(SR) as the ratio of the spread of simulated saccades during False Alarm trials, σFA, to 
that of Hit trials, σH.  Additionally, we computed the SCCI statistic (see Chapter 2) in two 
ways.  First, SCCI1D was the difference between the mean scalar decoded response during 
False Alarm trials and that during Miss trials, identical to the SCCI statistic computed in 
Chapter 2.  Second, SCCI2D was the difference between the fitted 2-D Gaussian 
amplitude parameter during False Alarm trials and that during Miss trials.  We identified 
the best-fitting model parameters by computing identical statistics in our real data and 
comparing each statistic to the corresponding statistic of the simulated data, and 
identified the point in parameter space that minimized the Euclidean distance between the 
simulated and empirical data. 
 
Comparison between intrinsic uncertainty decoder and optimal decoder 
In order to understand the impact of sub-optimal decoding due to intrinsic 
location uncertainty, we compared the performance of our best fitting intrinsic 
uncertainty decoder with the performance of the optimal decoder.  We first applied the 
optimal decoder (Chen et al., 2006) to the simulated V1 signals, whose pixel variance and 
spatial correlation structure was given by the analysis described above.  We defined the 
100 
 
variance of the pooled sensory response, when computed with the optimal decoder, as the 
unavoidable sensory variability.  Next, we applied the best-fitting intrinsic uncertainty 
decoder to the same simulated V1 signals, computed the variance of the pooled sensory 
response, and defined this value as the effective sensory variability.  We then quantified 
the impact of sub-optimal decoding as the difference between the effective sensory 
variability and the unavoidable sensory variability.  Finally, we computed the 
downstream variability as the difference between total choice-related variability and the 
effective sensory variability.  Each of these three quantities (unavoidable sensory 
variability, impact of sub-optimal decoding, and downstream variability) was expressed 
as a percentage of the total choice-related variability. 
 
Eye Movements 
To assess the relationship between saccadic eye movements and choice-related 
activity, we computed the (x,y) location, in degrees of visual angle relative to the fixation 
point, of the endpoint of the saccade during Hit and FA trials.  The endpoint was defined 
as the mean eye position during a 50-ms interval beginning at the moment the eye 
position entered a square window centered on the location of the Gabor target.  The 
location of the visual target was (0.5, -4.25) in Monkey T; and (0.5, -1.5) in Monkey C.  
The window was ≤ 6° for Monkey T, and ≤ 2° for Monkey C.  Each monkey was 
required to hold fixation in the target window for 100 ms in order to indicate a “choose 
target-present” response.  Before combining saccade endpoint data across the two 
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subjects, we first removed the mean endpoint vector (across both FA and Hit trials) from 
each monkey. 
In order to determine whether there was a trial-by-trial relationship between the 
location of saccade endpoints and the locus of cortical activity during individual Hit and 
FA trials, we re-centered the activity map on each trial based on the saccade endpoint 
vector.  In the present experiments we did not collect detailed retinotopic data; however, 
because our imaging region-of-interest (ROI) is located over an anterior portion of V1 in 
the left hemisphere of each monkey, and is aligned such that the top edge of the ROI is 
parallel to the lunate sulcus, we performed a simple procedure that approximates a 
correction from visual coordinates to cortical coordinates.  Maps corresponding to trials 
with saccade endpoints below the mean (negative y direction) were shifted to rightward; 
those from trials with endpoints above the mean (positive y direction) were shifted 
leftward.  Maps corresponding to trials with saccade endpoints to the right of the mean 
(positive x direction) were shifted downwards; those from trials with endpoints to the left 
of the mean (negative x direction) were shifted upwards.  Each trial’s activity map was 
shifted by an amount equal to the saccade endpoint vector’s deviation from the mean, 
times a cortical magnification factor (CMF).  We assumed a CMF of 4 mm / °.  We then 
fit the resulting mean activity maps for each behavioral category with a 2-dimensional 
Gaussian, and compared the fitted space constants of the re-centered maps with those 






We trained two monkeys to perform a simple reaction-time visual detection task 
(Chapter 2, Fig. 2.1).  Each trial began when the monkey directed gaze to a central 
fixation point.  During ‘target-present’ trials (50% of trials) the monkey was required to 
rapidly change his direction of gaze to a small visual target in its periphery; during 
‘target-absent’ trials (the remaining trials) the monkey was required to maintain fixation 
on the central fixation point.  The visual target consisted of a small Gabor patch stimulus 
(sinusoidal grating in a 2-D Gaussian envelope), and importantly, the stimulus was 
presented at the same location in visual space on all target-present trials.  Gabor stimuli 
are known to drive V1 cells effectively.  To make the task difficult, the stimulus was 
presented at one or two contrast levels near each monkey’s perceptual detection 
threshold.  The monkey’s response was classed as a ‘Hit’ (H) if he correctly detected the 
target, and a ‘Miss’ (M) if he failed to detect a target when it was presented.  The 
response was classed as a ‘False Alarm’ (FA) if the monkey incorrectly reported a target 
and a ‘Correct Rejection’ (CR) if he correctly indicated that a target was not presented 
(see Chapter 2, Table 2.1 for details regarding behavioral performance). 
We recorded population responses from V1 with voltage-sensitive dye imaging 
(VSDI) while the monkeys performed the task.  V1 contains cells that respond effectively 
to our visual stimulus, and thus the V1 population is likely to be useful to the monkey in 
performing the task.  Because our visual target is spatially localized and V1 responses are 
retinotopically organized, task-relevant neuronal population responses are likely to be 
confined to a small region in V1 (Chen et al., 2006; Sit et al., 2009) that can be entirely 
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captured by the VSDI technique.  Thus, our VSDI recordings are likely to capture most 
of the neurons that are useful to the monkey in performing the task. 
Results from a representative VSDI experiment (Fig. 3.1a) reveal robust, 
distributed V1 responses to the stimulus.  Fig. 3.1a shows the mean spatial spread of 
activation during stimulus-present and stimulus-absent trials, as well as the mean activity 
maps associated with each of the four behavioral outcomes, and the choice-related 
activity maps.  These data demonstrate that the visually-evoked response, while 
distributed over several mm of visual cortex, is nevertheless contained within our 
imaging region-of-interest; thus our VSDI recordings likely captured most of the cortical 
signals useful to the monkey.  The data in Fig. 3.1a,e is identical to that of Fig. 2.4a,d, 
and is reproduced here for convenience. 
 
Intrinsic uncertainty decoding algorithm 
 Our first goal is to identify an algorithm likely used by the monkey in decoding 
the sensory population.  A straightforward approach to this problem is to observe the 
spatial pattern of activity in choice-triggered averages of the sensory population.  This 
approach is a variant of the standard psychophysical reverse correlation paradigm.  In the 
standard paradigm, the experimenter presents a noisy visual pattern to the subject, who is 
required to indicate whether a target appeared or did not appear in the display.  The 
experimenter averages together the noisy stimulus maps belonging to one behavioral 
choice and separately averages together those belonging to the alternative choice (in trials 




Figure 3.1.  VSDI sensory population recordings and eye movements.  a-d, Example VSDI 
experiment in Monkey T.  a, Average cortical activity maps separated by stimulus condition 
(rows) and behavioral choice (columns), and averaged over a 100 ms temporal window (see 
Methods for details).   Upper row of panel a represents neural activity during target-present 
trials; lower row shows activity during target-absent trials.  Activity maps are shown separately 
for ‘choose target-present’ (H and FA) and ‘choose target-absent’ (M and CR) trials.  ‘H-M’, 
difference map of activity during Hit and Miss trials.  ‘FA-CR’, difference map of activity during 
FA and CR trials.  b, Fitted space constants of the choice-triggered maps, in mm of cortex.  c, 
Standard deviation of saccade endpoints, in degrees of visual angle.  d, Fitted amplitude of the 
Miss and FA maps.  In b-d,f-h, error bars indicate bootstrapped standard error of the mean.  e-h, 
Aggregate summary of VSDI and behavioral results collapsed over 13 experiments in Monkey T 
and 2 experiments in Monkey C.  Same organization as in a-d.  In g, the mean location of each 
monkey’s saccade endpoint data was removed before combining across monkeys (see Methods). 
 
 
two averages.  The resulting map reveals the subject’s template, or a map of linear 
weights by which the subject is assumed to multiply the noisy display on each trial to 
form the decision variable.  In this variant of the paradigm, which may be called neural 
reverse correlation, we average together trial-to-trial variability in neural population 
activity rather than that in an external visual display.  Fig. 3.2 shows the average choice-
related population activity, computed across all trials, after the mean stimulus-evoked 
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response has been removed from stimulus-present trials, and separately for target-present 
and target-absent trials.  As in the standard paradigm, the resulting choice-triggered map 
is expected to reveal the decoding template the subject applies to the noisy cortical 




Figure 3.2.  Average choice-related population activity maps.  “Yes” – “No”, mean 
choice-related population activity computed across all trials, after the mean stimulus-
evoked response has been removed from all target-present trials.  H-M, mean choice-
related activity map during target-present trials.  FA-CR, mean choice-related activity 
map during target-absent trials. 
 
 
Importantly, under the assumption that the monkey decodes the sensory 
population response by the application of a fixed, linear decoding rule as described 
above, applying the neural reverse correlation procedure to our data should produce 
identical choice-triggered maps during target-absent trials as during target-present trials.  
Because the presence of the stimulus does not alter the noise properties of our data (see 
Chapter 2, Fig. 2.8), and because the neural reverse correlation procedure is applied only 
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to trials belonging to two alternative choices within the same stimulus condition, the 
presence or absence of a stimulus should have no effect on the resulting maps.  Thus we 
can test whether the monkey employs such a rule by comparing the choice-triggered map 
obtained during target-present trials with that obtained during target-absent trials. 
Features of our VSDI data suggest that the monkeys’ decoding algorithm is 
inconsistent with a fixed template.  Fig. 3.1a-d shows the results of an example 
experiment in Monkey T.  Because the results from the two monkeys were qualitatively 
similar (see Chapter 2, Fig. 2.6), 13 experiments from Monkey T and 2 experiments from 
Monkey C were combined to produce our aggregate results (Fig. 3.1e-h).  Fig. 3.1a,e (‘H-
M’, ‘FA-CR’) show the choice-triggered maps obtained during target-present and target-
absent trials, respectively.  Comparison of these maps reveals that choice-related activity 
in V1 is distributed more broadly in the absence of a stimulus (σFA-CR = 4.02 mm) than in 
the presence of a stimulus (σH-M = 2.08 mm) (Fig. 3.1f), whose ratio, 1.99 (95% CI: [0.98 
3.29]), is significantly greater than unity (p = 0.032, one-tailed bootstrap test).  This 
finding could result from the subject using a distinct linear template during target-absent 
trials as during target-present trials.  However, because the subject has no advance 
knowledge of whether the target will appear on a given trial, the subject is unable to 
employ such a strategy. 
Instead, these data may be consistent with a decoding algorithm that suffers from 
location uncertainty.  We reasoned that if the subject has imperfect knowledge as to the 
precise location of the visual target, an effective strategy to decode the sensory 
population might be to search for a peak of activation over a region of cortex that is likely 
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to contain the stimulus response.  The decoding circuit would look for the best match to a 
template that resembles the evoked response, and weight the goodness of this match by 
the likelihood that the response would occur in a given location, based on the subject’s 
memory.  Such a strategy would be employed on stimulus-present and stimulus-absent 
trials alike.  We reasoned further that the presence of even a weak stimulus would 
increase the likelihood that a peak of activation resembling the evoked response would 
occur at a cortical location that is common to all target-present trials (i.e., the location in 
cortex that retinotopically corresponds to the actual, fixed, stimulus location).  Such a 
mechanism would lead to choice-triggered maps that are more spatially localized in 
target-present trials than in target-absent trials, potentially explaining our results. 
Analysis of eye movements further supports the hypothesis that the subject is 
uncertain about the precise location of the target.  We require our subjects to make a 
saccadic eye movement to the target location when a stimulus has been detected.  In trials 
in which the monkey indicates a target-present choice (whether correctly or incorrectly), 
we extinguished the target immediately upon onset of the eye movement and replaced it 
with a small point at the target location.  Because this visual reminder appeared after 
saccade initiation, it did not affect the monkey’s saccade endpoint, which displayed large 
trial-to-trial variability.  We observe that the location of saccade endpoints is distributed 
more broadly during incorrect detections (σFA = 0.39 degrees) than during correct 
detections (σH = 0.28 degrees) (Fig. 3.1g), whose ratio is 1.41 (95% CI: [1.19 1.63]), 
significantly greater than unity (p ≈ 0, one-tailed bootstrap test).  This behavior is also 
consistent with the general spatial uncertainty decoder framework described above.  For 
108 
 
example, a subject who is uncertain about the precise location of the visual target, but 
who is required to indicate the perceived presence of the target with a saccadic eye 
movement to its location, could adopt a strategy to make an eye movement to the location 
he thinks is the most likely.  According to the subject, the most likely location in visual 
space is that which corresponds to the retinotopic location in sensory cortex that shows 
the strongest activity.  Together, the greater spread of activity in the choice-triggered map 
collected during target-absent trials than during target-present trials, as well as the greater 
spread of saccade endpoints during target-absent trials than during target-present trials 
suggests that in our task, subjects may be impacted by some form of spatial uncertainty. 
In our effort to discover potential decoding algorithms that are consistent with our 
physiological and behavioral results, we also aimed to explain a third key feature of our 
data:  that average False Alarm activity exceeds average Miss activity.  Recall from 
Chapter 2 that we introduced a metric, stimulus-choice correspondence index (SCCI), 
that quantifies the difference between the mean decoded (scalar) response during False 
Alarm trials and that during Miss trials.  In the context of Chapter 2, the value of the 
SCCI quantity depended on the specific algorithm used to decode the sensory population 
responses, and we repeated our analysis for a family of 9 alternative, biologically 
plausible pooling rules.  However, in the present analysis we developed a variant of the 
SCCI metric that is readout-independent.  This metric, which we call SCCI2D, is the 
amplitude of the 2-D Gaussian-fitted mean False Alarm population response minus that 
of the mean Miss population response (see Methods).  Fig. 3.1d,h shows the fitted 
amplitudes of the Miss (green) and False Alarm (red) response.  In our combined data, 
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the False Alarm response amplitude was 0.80, and the Miss response amplitude was 0.33; 
their difference, SCCI2D = 0.47 (95% CI: [0.00 1.02]), was significantly greater than zero 
(p = 0.05, two-tailed bootstrap test).  This additional formulation of the SCCI metric 
enabled us to assess the goodness with which potential decoding algorithms could explain 
this feature of our data. 
To determine whether an intrinsic uncertainty decoding algorithm could explain 
our imaging and behavioral results, we developed a simple model (Fig. 3.3).  In our 
model of the formation of the decision, the brain first encodes the visual stimulus in a 
sensory population (Fig. 3.3a, ‘Sensory Encoding’).  The brain then decodes the signals 
by transforming the distributed sensory signals into a single value, which could occur by 
convergent and parallel projections to subsequent layers (Fig. 3.3a, ‘Decoding’).  Finally, 
we assumed that this single-valued decoded sensory response is corrupted by additional 
neural variability introduced by a subsequent stage (Fig. 3.3a, ‘Downstream Variability’).  
The resulting single-valued response represents the decision variable, which is compared 
to a criterion to determine the monkey’s binary choice. 
We considered a spatial uncertainty decision algorithm by which the brain may 
transform the distributed sensory responses into a single-valued variable in a series of 
three layers (Fig. 3.3b), although other neural implementations of our algorithm are 
possible.  We first simulated the encoding stage in V1 as a 2-dimensional patch of 
neurons/pixels with signal and noise characteristics consistent with those observed in the 
real data (see Methods).  In our model, the decoding circuit could search for a template of 





Figure 3.3.  Intrinsic uncertainty decoder framework.  a, General decision framework 
in which the intrinsic uncertainty decoder is applied.  Stimulus-related signals are 
encoded in a 2-dimensional patch of sensory cortex (‘Sensory Encoding’); a decoding 
algorithm (‘Decoding’) transforms the 2-dimensional signals into a scalar quantity; 
independent noise is added to the decoded scalar response (‘Downstream Variability’); 
the result is then compared to a criterion to determine the binary choice.  b, Successive 
stages of the intrinsic uncertainty decoding algorithm.  On each trial, the decoder first 
searches sensory cortex for a peak of activity (‘Template Matching’); second, the decoder 
evaluates the likelihood that a potential match occurred due to the presence of a stimulus, 
given the brain’s imperfect knowledge of the stimulus location (‘Uncertainty 
Weighting’); finally, the decoder identifies the maximally responsive pixel (‘Max’), 
whose value is taken to be the decoded scalar response. 
 
 
the second layer (Fig. 3.3b, ‘Template Matching’).  Each neuron/pixel in the second layer 
receives connections from a small neighborhood of sensory neurons and averages their 
responses together.  The inputs from sensory neurons are assigned weights proportional 
to a 2-D Gaussian centered on the sensory neuron that has the same topographic location 
of its corresponding neuron in the second layer.  Due to convergence, neurons of the 
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second layer are driven effectively when a collection of nearby sensory neurons are 
activated together, such as when they respond to a spatially distributed stimulus.  In the 
absence of target location uncertainty, neurons of the second layer could most effectively 
distinguish between target-absent and target-present trials when the pattern of weights 
assigned to the converging inputs matches the spatial pattern of sensory activation, 
assuming the noisy sensory activity is spatially white.  When the sensory activity is 
spatially correlated, the template that most effectively distinguishes between the two 
stimulus conditions is a Difference-of-Gaussians whose weights are proportional to the 
average stimulus-evoked response after it has been whitened twice (Chen et al., 2006). 
Next, the decision circuit evaluates whether a potential template match identified 
in the second layer is likely to have arisen from the physical stimulus, based on the 
subject’s imperfect prior knowledge about the location of the stimulus in visual space.  
Signals from the second layer could be sent via unequally weighted parallel projections to 
a third layer (Fig. 3.3b, ‘Uncertainty Weighting’).  In this step, weights are assigned 
proportional to a 2-dimensional Gaussian centered on the cortical location that 
corresponds retinotopically to the location in visual space where the target is most likely 
to appear, based on the subject’s memory.  Due to unequally weighted parallel 
connections, potential matches are weighted more heavily when the match occurs near a 
location the subject believes is the correct target location. 
Finally, the decision circuit transforms the distributed responses of the third layer 
into a single-valued response by selecting the maximally responsive neuron (Fig. 3.3b, 
‘Max’).  In this final stage, inhibitory horizontal connections in the third layer could 
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instantiate a winner-take-all-like mechanism whereby the activity of the maximally 
responsive neuron is magnified at the expense of all other neuronal responses.  The 
response of this neuron represents the decoded sensory response.  Furthermore, since the 
decoding circuit preserves topographic information about the cortical responses at each 
stage, the location in visual space that corresponds retinotopically to the cortical location 
of this neuron represents the decoded location of the visual target.  This neuron’s 
response is corrupted by additional neural variability (Fig. 3.3a, ‘Downstream 
Variability’) to form the decision variable.  If the decision variable exceeds a criterion, 
the subject chooses “target-present” and makes a saccadic eye movement to the decoded 
target location; otherwise the subject chooses “target-absent” by maintaining fixation on 
the central fixation point. 
Our model has three parameters.  The degree of convergence from the first layer 
to the second determines the size of the template being considered, and is quantified as 
the standard deviation (σtemplate, in pixels/cortical distance) of the 2-dimensional Gaussian 
pattern of weights with which the first layer projects to the second.  Similarly, the degree 
of location uncertainty is determined by the standard deviation, σuncertainty, of the 2-
dimensional Gaussian pattern of weights with which the second layer projects in parallel 
to the third.  Finally, the variability of the sensory neurons, together with σtemplate and 
σuncertainty, determines the subject’s accuracy in performing the task, and is quantified as 
the variance of the individual neurons/pixels in V1, σV12.  We performed a series of 
simulations to determine whether our model framework could explain our imaging and 
behavioral results.  The simulations were carried out by applying a sequence of 
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mathematical operations that are equivalent to the example connectionist framework 
described here (see Methods). 
The essential behavior of our model reveals three main results, and can be 
understood intuitively.  First, within our framework, location uncertainty is required to 
achieve choice-triggered maps that are more broadly distributed during target-absent 
trials than during target-present trials.  Examination of a small number of simulated 
example trials clarifies how location uncertainty leads to such a result.  Fig. 3.4 shows the 
simulated population activity as it evolves over the three successive stages of the intrinsic 
uncertainty decoder, for five example trials.  Each of the five trials is shown in the 
absence of a stimulus-evoked response (leftmost three columns) and in the presence of 
the stimulus-evoked response (rightmost three columns).  Consider first the target-absent 
trials.  The simulated V1 activity (Fig. 3.4, left side, ‘Encoding’) in these example trials is 
composed of white noise.  The uncertainty decoder transforms this activity by its 
convergent projections to the second layer (‘Template Matching’), which results in a 
blurred version of the same noise pattern.  In turn, this second layer projects in parallel to 
the third with weights proportional to a large (i.e., high uncertainty) 2-D Gaussian.  
Because the location uncertainty is large in this example, the location of the maximally 
responding pixel (indicated by a white square) can occur with nearly equal probability at 
any pixel in the image, and indeed is widely dispersed across the five example trials 
shown.  In contrast, when a simulated, deterministic 2-D Gaussian evoked response is 
added to the same five noise patterns (rightmost three columns of Fig. 3.4), the increased 
activity due to the evoked response increases the likelihood that the maximally 
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responding pixel will occur near the center of the cortical image, despite the large 
location uncertainty.  The tendency for maximally responding pixels to occur near the 
center of the image during target-present trials, but not target-absent trials, results in a 
narrowing of the spatial distribution of activity during target-present trials (particularly in 
‘Hit’ trials, in which the value of the maximally responding pixel is large enough to cross 
the monkey’s criterion and elicit a “target-present” response), as compared to that in 
target-absent trials.  The interaction between the stimulus-evoked response and the 
uncertainty weighting, in turn, results in a narrower spread of cortical activity in choice-
triggered maps during target-present trials, as compared to target-absent trials.  
Additionally, because our simulated saccadic eye movements are determined by the 
location of the maximally responding pixel in each trial (see Methods), the same 
reasoning can potentially explain our behavioral result that the spread of the endpoints of 
the monkey’s saccadic eye movements is greater during target-absent trials (i.e., FA 
trials) than during target-present trials (i.e., Hit trials). 
In contrast, in the absence of location uncertainty, choice-related difference maps 
obtained during target-present trials will be identical to those obtained from target-absent 
trials.  The no-uncertainty case is a special case of our uncertainty decoder in which the 
uncertainty weighting map is an impulse function, with a weight of unity at the center of 
the evoked response and weights of zero elsewhere.  Because the maximally responding 
pixel can occur in just one location, this special case of the uncertainty decoder reduces to 
a linear model whereby sensory signals are transformed into scalar responses through the 




Figure 3.4.  Effect of the stimulus on the intrinsic uncertainty decoder.  Each row 
shows the behavior of the intrinsic uncertainty decoder for five example trials without an 
evoked response (leftmost three columns) and for the same five noise trials with a 
stimulus-evoked response added (rightmost three columns).  In each side of the figure, 
the first column represents the noise pattern of each trial (‘Encoding’); the second column 
shows the blurred response of the ‘Template Matching’ stage of the uncertainty decoder; 
third column shows the ‘Uncertainty Weighting’ stage of the decoder.  See Fig. 3.3 and 
text for explanation of each stage.  White square indicates the location of the maximally 
responding pixel for each trial. 
 
 
the same reason, the simulated saccadic eye movement will terminate in the same 
location in visual space in all trials.  Thus, within our framework, location uncertainty is 
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required in order to obtain stimulus condition-related differences in the spread of the 
choice-triggered maps as well as the spread in saccade endpoints. 
The second main result of our simulation is that the narrowing effect exerted by 
the stimulus-evoked response on the choice-triggered maps during location uncertainty is 
parametrically related to the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) in V1.  The narrowing effect 
described above occurs because the presence of the stimulus-evoked response increases 
the likelihood that the most highly active pixels will occur near the center of the image.  
Intuitively, stronger evoked responses will produce a stronger effect.  This narrowing 
effect is strongest when variability in V1 is small (i.e., high SNR), and weakest when 
variability in V1 is large (i.e., low SNR).  This observation suggests that in order to 
explain our physiological result that the choice-triggered map during target-absent trials 
is significantly broader than that during target-present trials, our parameter representing 
the variability in V1, σV12, must be sufficiently small. 
The third main result of our intrinsic uncertainty decoder simulation is that our 
critical finding from Chapter 2 – that average cortical activity during False Alarm trials 
exceeds average cortical activity during Miss trials only when sensory variability is large 
– extends to decoding models that suffer from location uncertainty.  We learned from the 
model presented in Chapter 2 that the variability in V1 must be sufficiently large (DF ≥ 
0.55, see Chapter 2, Fig. 2.3e, black trace) to explain our finding that average activity 
during False Alarm trials exceeds that during Miss trials.  We performed a similar 
analysis with our intrinsic uncertainty decoder.  For each pair of intrinsic uncertainty 
decoder parameters (σtemplate, σuncertainty), we varied the amount of V1 neuron/pixel noise 
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such that the total fraction of choice-related variability present in V1 (i.e., DF) varied 
from zero to unity.  We then plotted the SCCI statistic as a function of DF for each 
decoder (see Methods for details on computing the SCCI statistic in the context of the 
present analysis).  In all cases, the SCCI statistic began at -1 when DF = 0, and increased 
linearly with increasing DF.  The slope of the line relating SCCI to DF depended on our 
assumption about the noise structure in V1 (see Methods).  The maximum slope (which 
occurred under the assumption of white noise) produced a line that is identical to that 
shown in Fig. 2.3e, black trace; all other cases produced lines with shallower slopes.  
This result suggests that for all instances of the intrinsic uncertainty decoder considered 
here, the function shown in Fig. 2.3e yields a lower bound on DF for an observed SCCI.  
Thus for an intrinsic uncertainty decoder, as in the fixed decoders considered earlier, in 
order to explain our physiological result that FA activity exceeds Miss activity, σV12 must 
be sufficiently large. 
These observations thus illustrate an important tradeoff in the σV12 parameter.  On 
one hand, V1 variability determines the relationship between the mean False Alarm 
response and to the mean Miss response, and must be large enough to match our 
empirical finding that the former exceeds the latter.  On the other hand, the amount of V1 
variability must be sufficiently small such that the presence of a stimulus has an 
appreciable effect in narrowing the choice-triggered map and distribution of saccadic eye 
movements during target-present trials, as described above.  Together, these observations 
suggest that if a pair of intrinsic uncertainty decoding parameters (σtemplate, σuncertainty) is 
found that can potentially explain our data, we expect it to do so only over a limited range 
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of the DF quantity.  Thus, any solution to our intrinsic uncertainty model will 
simultaneously provide lower and upper bounds on the fraction of choice-related 
variability present in V1. 
According to our model, the three critical features of our neural and behavioral 
data can be reconciled simultaneously only over a narrow region of parameter space.  The 
best-fitting model parameters, which were obtained by minimizing the Euclidean distance 
between the observed and predicted values of our three key quantities (see Methods), 
yielded the solution (DF = 0.97, σtemplate = 1.5 mm, σuncertainty = 3.5 mm).  The predicted 
average activity maps of our best-fitting solution, shown in Fig. 3.5a, are qualitatively 
similar to the average activity maps computed from the real data (Fig. 3.1a,e).  Average 
choice-related activity during target-absent trials (‘FA-CR’) is more broadly distributed 
than during target-present trials (‘H-M’), and average False Alarm activity exceeds 
average Miss activity.  The quantitative predictions of three key features of our data (Fig. 
3.5b-d) resulted in a choice-triggered map ratio (σFA-CR / σH-M) of 1.18, a saccade ratio 
(σFA / σH) of 1.27, and a difference between the average False Alarm and Miss activity 
(SCCI2D) of 0.27, which fall within the 95% confidence intervals of our real data.  
Additional solutions, which yielded values within the 95% confidence intervals of our 
observed quantities, occurred within a neighborhood of this solution:  0.85 ≤ DF ≤ 0.99, 
0.5 mm ≤ σtemplate ≤  2 mm, 3 mm ≤ σuncertainty ≤  5 mm.  Our best-fitting solution suggests 
that subjects decode sensory population signals by searching for a peak of activation that 
is somewhat smaller (σtemplate = 1.5 mm) than the observed stimulus-evoked response 
(σevoked = 2.5 mm), over a region of cortex larger (σuncertainty = 3.5 mm) than the stimulus-
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evoked response, and that approximately 97% of the subject’s task-limiting neural 




Figure 3.5.  Results of an example intrinsic uncertainty decoder applied to simulated 
data.  This model solution occurs at (DF = 0.97, σtemplate = 1.5 mm, σuncertainty = 3.5 mm) 
(see text for details). Same organization as Fig. 3.1. 
 
 
Alternative uncertainty decoders 
Importantly, while the simplest formulation of the intrinsic uncertainty framework 
provided solutions that are statistically consistent with the data, it is possible that other 
uncertainty decoders could provide a better explanation of the data.  To address this 
possibility, we explored two alternative formulations of the uncertainty decoder.  First, 
we considered the possibility that the monkey’s search template consisted of weights 
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proportional to a difference-of-Gaussians (DOG), exploring the hypothesis that the 
monkey may attempt to apply the optimal decoding strategy (Chen et al., 2006) in the 
presence of intrinsic uncertainty.  In this formulation, the search template was defined as 
the difference of two Gaussians that optimally separates target-present trials from target-
absent trials in the absence of location uncertainty.  This template was then tested over a 
broad range of the σuncertainty parameter.  In cases in which the simulated V1 responses 
contained strong spatial correlations (see Methods), the optimal DOG template, when 
degraded by uncertainty, was unable to yield positive values for the SCCI2D metric and is 
therefore inconsistent with our physiological results.  In cases in which the simulated V1 
responses were composed primarily of white noise, the optimal DOG template was 
similar to the average evoked-activity map, and therefore performed similarly to the 
simple uncertainty decoder presented here.  Thus we cannot rule out the possibility that 
the monkey’s decoding algorithm contains a DOG template. 
Second, we tested formulations in which the severe non-linearity of the maximum 
operation (Fig. 3.3b, ‘Max’) was softened by generalizing this stage of the model to the 
p-norm operation (see Methods) for values of exponent p ranging from 1 to infinity.  The 
p-norm is equivalent to the maximum operation when p = ∞, and lesser values of the 
exponent p represent less severe nonlinearities.  We tested this formulation of the model 
for both Gaussian and difference-of-Gaussian search templates, and found that the 
important features of our data could be satisfied only for large values of p (p ≥ 10), 
suggesting that in order to explain our data, the monkey’s decoding algorithm must 
contain a significant nonlinearity.  However, none of the p-norm models we tested with p 
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≤ ∞ provided better explanations of our data than did the model containing the maximum 
operation. 
 
Impact of sub-optimal decoding 
In order to understand the impact of sub-optimal decoding on task performance, 
we compared the performance of the intrinsic uncertainty decoder with that of the 
optimal decoder derived previously in our lab (Chen et al., 2006).  A sub-optimal decoder 
produces, by definition, a pooled sensory response that is noisier than that produced by 
the optimal decoder.  The difference between the variance of the pooled sensory response 
resulting from optimal decoding and that resulting from sub-optimal decoding represents 
the inefficiency due to sub-optimal decoding.  Based on our monkeys’ behavioral 
performance and our assumptions, the total neural variability related to the subjects’ 
decision (i.e., the decision variable) had a variance of 0.4565 (in arbitrary normalized 
units).  Using our solution from the first part of our study, the intrinsic uncertainty 
decoder yields a pooled sensory variance of 0.4382.  In comparison, applying the optimal 
decoder to the same simulated patch of V1 yields a pooled sensory variance of 0.3332.  
The difference, 0.1050, accounts for 24% of the total behavioral-related neural 
variability. 
Our model solution, together with the application of the optimal decoder to our 
simulated sensory responses, allows us to report the relative contributions of unavoidable 
sensory variability, sub-optimal decoding, and downstream noise to the subject’s 
performance.  We defined the unavoidable sensory variability to be the variance of the 
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pooled sensory response obtained by applying the optimal decoder to the simulated 
sensory signals.  The contribution of sub-optimal decoding to task inefficiency was the 
difference between the pooled sensory variance obtained with the optimal decoder and 
that obtained with the intrinsic uncertainty decoder, as outlined above.  Finally, we 
classed the remaining, unaccounted-for variability as downstream noise.  The sum of the 
three variances, σsensory2 + σsub-optimality2 + σdownstream2 = σtd2, represents the total decision-
related variability.  According to our model solution, these sources of variability account 
for 73%, 24%, and 3% of the total behavioral variability, respectively.  Fig. 3.6 depicts 




Figure 3.6.  Partitioning of neural variability that relates to choice.  Total area 
represents 100% of choice-related variability.  green, ‘Unavoidable sensory variability’ 
represents the percentage of the total choice-related variability obtained by decoding the 
simulated V1 signals optimally.  red, ‘Sensory variability attributed to sub-optimal 
decoding’ is the difference between the variability obtained via the uncertainty decoder 
shown in Fig. 3.3 and that obtained with the optimal decoder.  blue, the remaining 
choice-related variability (3% of total) represents the unaccounted-for variability, and is 
attributed to downstream noise. 
 
 
Relationship between saccadic eye movements and cortical activity 
To explore the relationship between saccadic eye movements and choice-related 
activity, we computed the mean location of the endpoints of saccadic eye movements 
during both types of “choose target-present” trials.  In addition to the significantly greater 
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spread of saccade endpoints during FA than during Hit trials reported above, we found 
that the mean location of saccade endpoints during FA trials was significantly more 
foveal than that during Hit trials, by approximately 0.0835 degrees (p ≈ 0, bootstrap test).  
We then examined the (x,y) locations of the 2-dimensional Gaussians that best fit each of 
the choice-related maps.  We found that the choice-related activity map during target-
absent trials (Fig. 3.1e, ‘FA-CR’) was shifted by approximately 3.8 mm towards the 
fovea as compared to that of target-present trials (Fig. 3.1e, ‘H-M’) (p ≈ 0, bootstrap test).  
This result is qualitatively consistent with our model assumption that the monkey makes 
a saccadic eye movement to the location in visual space that corresponds retinotopically 
to the location of maximal cortical activity in the final stage of the uncertainty decoder.  
However, these results appear to be quantitatively inconsistent with one another, given 
this model assumption.  Assuming a cortical magnification factor of 4 mm / °, the 
observed difference in the mean position of the endpoints of FA saccades and that of Hit 
saccades (0.0835 degrees) should result from a shift in the mean location of the two 
choice-related activity maps of just 0.334 mm, in contrast to the 3.8 mm shift we observe 
in these maps.  Thus while the observed shift in saccade endpoints and the observed shift 
in the locus of choice-related population activity co-occur in the expected direction, the 
relative magnitudes of these shifts are inconsistent with our model assumptions. 
Because both the mean saccade endpoint and the average locus of cortical activity 
are shifted towards the fovea during target-absent trials in comparison to target-present 
trials, we hypothesized that these quantities may be related on a trial-by-trial basis. We 
tested this hypothesis in two ways.  First, we partitioned the data into two halves:  those 
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trials in which the distance from the fixation point to the saccade endpoint was above the 
median, and those trials that fell below the median.  For each half, we fitted 2-D 
Gaussians to the mean FA activity maps as well as the mean Hit maps, and tested for a 
difference in location.  We did not observe any significant shift in the mean location of 
either the FA or Hit activity maps in either monkey.  Second, we reasoned that if a 
saccade elicited by the perceived presence of a Gabor target is directed towards the locus 
of cortical activity in the final stage of the uncertainty decoder, re-centering the 
population activity maps based on the eye movements on a trial-by-trial basis (see 
Methods) may reduce the apparent spread of activity.  This correction did not yield any 
significant differences in the space constant of the 2-D Gaussian fits of the maps.  The 
lack of a trial-by-trial relationship between saccade endpoints and cortical activity maps, 
despite our finding that FA trials are associated with significantly shorter saccades and 
significantly more foveal cortical activity, could be due to the presence of significant 
measurement noise and our limited number of trials.  However, this result may also 
provide evidence against our location uncertainty hypothesis, suggesting that a different 
model could better explain our data. 
 
3.5 Discussion 
Here we present two main findings.  First, in our visual detection task, 
performance is likely to be limited by intrinsic uncertainty as to the precise location of 
the visual target.  Using a combination of psychophysical and imaging measures, together 
with a simple computational model, we identified a family of plausible candidate 
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decoding algorithms used by the brain to form the decision.  Given this uncertainty, in 
order to decode sensory population signals the brain likely looks for a peak of activation 
over a region of the sensory cortical population centered on the location of the stimulus-
evoked response.  The search template (σtemplate ≈ 1.5 mm) is somewhat narrower than the 
evoked response (σevoked ≈ 2.5 mm) and the search area (σuncertainty ≈ 3.5 mm) is larger 
than the evoked response.  Second, the sub-optimality of this class of decoders, which 
results from the subject’s intrinsic location uncertainty, degrades task performance 
substantially.  We quantified the sub-optimality by comparing our family of intrinsic 
uncertainty decoders with the optimal decoder.  Our results suggest that while 
performance is likely to be limited primarily by neural variability in sensory cortex (in 
agreement with the conclusions of Chapter 2), a significant portion of this task-limiting 
variability occurs due to sub-optimal decoding. 
Our findings are consistent with our previous result that the majority of choice-
related neural variability is present in the sensory population (Chapter 2).  Our simple 
model framework, when constrained by features of our VSDI recordings, predicts that 
neural variability in sensory cortex accounts for approximately 97% of the neural 
variability related to choice, consistent with our previous result that at least 81% of 
choice-related variability occurs in sensory cortex (Chapter 2).  Previously, we tested a 
diverse class of fixed decoding strategies.  Here we demonstrate that a class of intrinsic 
uncertainty decoders better explains key features of our imaging and behavioral data.  In 
addition, we found that the quantitative relationship between the SCCI quantity and the 
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fraction of choice-related activity occurring in V1 (Chapter 2) extends to this class of 
nonlinear decoders. 
Our results are consistent with a previous psychophysical study suggesting that 
human detection and localization performance is limited by intrinsic spatial uncertainty 
(Michel and Geisler, 2011).  Here we extend this finding to non-human primates, and 
also employ brain imaging to demonstrate a neural signature of such location uncertainty 
in sensory cortex, thus identifying a potential physiological mechanism underlying this 
behavioral phenomenon.  However, the two studies differ in their quantitative estimate of 
intrinsic location uncertainty.  The human psychophysical study suggests that the amount 
of intrinsic location uncertainty subjects have can be described with a space constant that 
is equal to approximately 10% of the target eccentricity.  Given their results, the target 
eccentricities used in our study (4.28 degrees for Monkey T; 1.58 degrees for Monkey C) 
would be associated with intrinsic uncertainty with space constants of 0.43 and 0.16 
degrees, respectively.  In contrast, our model solution to the intrinsic uncertainty decoder 
suggests that the uncertainty region in sensory cortex has a space constant of 
approximately 3.5 mm, corresponding to approximately 0.875 degrees of visual angle 
(assuming a CMF of 4 mm/°).  Thus our results yielded estimates of intrinsic uncertainty 
that were 2-6x larger than those of the previous study. 
It is possible that alternative formulations of the uncertainty decoder, beyond 
those considered here, could better explain our imaging and behavioral results.  Here we 
report the results of a simple decoder that assumes 2-D Gaussian shapes for the search 
template and uncertainty region.  These assumptions limit the dimensionality of our 
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model, while also allowing for a straightforward interpretation of its parameters.  
However, a more general Bayesian framework, together with a maximum-likelihood 
estimation procedure, may yield a variant of the uncertainty decoder that can better 
account for our data.  Thus, a formalization of the computational modeling approach we 
present here is an important goal for future research. 
Our findings are consistent with a computational modeling study that suggests 
behavioral performance is significantly limited by sub-optimal inference (Beck et al., 
2012).  Whereas the previous study argues that sub-optimal inference is a unique source 
of noise that is added to neural sensory variability, here we describe sub-optimal 
decoding as a mechanism that causes downstream brain areas to inherit sensory noise that 
otherwise would have been removed by applying the optimal decoder.  Nevertheless, here 
we provide physiological and behavioral evidence that sub-optimal decoding of sensory 
signals indeed largely limits behavioral performance.  While sub-optimal decoding leads 
to a significant reduction in performance, our model also shows that the majority of the 
task-limiting variability arises from unavoidable sensory variability, suggesting that in 
our subjects encoding variability dominates decoding inefficiencies in determining 
behavioral performance. 
Finally, our study provides psychophysical and brain imaging evidence apropos to 
a long-standing debate concerning the lower envelope principle, or the hypothesis that 
behavioral performance depends on the responses of only the most reliable individual 
sensory neurons.  Our findings suggest, instead, that perceptual decisions are likely based 
on a large population of sensory neurons, and that in some tasks, intrinsic uncertainty 
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Chapter 4:  General Conclusions 
 
In this dissertation I pursued two fundamental questions that further our 
understanding of the nature of perceptual decisions.  First, what fraction of choice-related 
variability is present in population activity in primary sensory cortex; and to what degree 
does this sensory cortical variability limit perceptual decisions?  Second, how does the 
monkey combine information across the sensory population to form the basis of a 
decision; and to what degree does this decoding process limit perceptual decisions?  We 
used a combination of voltage-sensitive dye imaging in awake, behaving monkeys and 
simple computational modeling to address these questions in the context of the primate 
visual system.  I report four main findings: 
1. Choice-related neural variability is distributed broadly over sensory cortex; in our 
task significant choice-related variability can be found over an area larger than 
that activated by the visual stimulus; 
2. A large majority of choice-related variability occurs as early as V1 at the level of 
neural populations; 
3. Perceptual decisions are likely based on the combined activity of a large 
population of sensory neurons, rather than on the activity of a small number of the 
most sensitive neurons; 
4. Perceptual decisions are likely limited by intrinsic uncertainty about the stimulus, 




The quantitative solutions to our models of the decision process, constrained by 
our physiological and behavioral data, allow us to estimate the relative contributions of 
various stages in the decision process to behavioral task performance.  Our results 
suggest that performance in our simple task may be limited primarily by the efficiency of 
the sensory encoding process, secondarily by sub-optimal decoding of the sensory 
population, and only modestly by the presence of neural variability downstream from the 
encoding and decoding processes. 
In the course of arriving at these general conclusions, we developed a novel 
statistical framework for quantifying the fraction of choice-related variability present in 
an experimenter’s measurement of neural population activity in the presence of 
variability that is unrelated to choice, such as measurement noise.  Our statistic, 
‘stimulus-choice correspondence index’ (SCCI) can be used by other researchers 
exploring the relationship between measurements of population activity and choice in a 
binary decision task. 
Finally, we present here for the first time a physiological picture of a spatial 
pooling algorithm that provides a mechanism for a simple binary decision.  Our results 
suggest that the binary decision procedure in our detection task could be biologically 
implemented over a series of three cortical layers with convergent and parallel 
projections.  In addition, we describe this decision mechanism by an equivalent sequence 





4.1 Majority of choice-related activity in V1 
I presented evidence that during a simple binary perceptual decision, the majority 
of the subject’s decision-related neural activity can be found as early as primary visual 
cortex.  In Chapter 2, we developed a metric, ‘stimulus-choice correspondence index’ 
(SCCI), which quantifies the difference between the mean population activity during 
False Alarm trials and that of Miss trials.  We found that SCCI varies linearly with the 
fraction of choice-related neural variability occurring in our measurement, and used its 
empirical value to determine that a minimum of 81% of choice-related variability occurs 
in V1 in our task.  In Chapter 3, we identified a simple decision circuit that provides a 
mechanism for binary decisions under location uncertainty, which, when constrained with 
our empirical data, also suggests that the vast majority of choice-related information is 
present in V1, perhaps as much as 97%. 
Our finding that the majority of choice-related neural variability occurs in early 
sensory cortex provides an explanation for the weak choice probabilities often reported in 
sensory cortex, including the recent discovery of single unit choice probabilities in V1 in 
a similar task (Palmer et al., 2007).  Previous empirical studies, owing to their focus on 
single neurons in isolation, were unable to determine the reason for weak choice-related 
signals:  the remaining choice-related variability could be distributed across other sensory 
neurons, or could occur downstream from sensory cortex.  In contrast, our population-
based approach allowed us to offer a solution to this question in our simple detection task 
by enabling us to place a quantitative upper bound on the amount of downstream noise.  
In the work I present here, we suggest that choice probabilities observed in individual 
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neurons in early sensory cortex are weak not because of the presence of large amounts of 
downstream noise, but because perceptual decisions are likely based on large populations 
of sensory neurons rather than on the activity of a single neuron or a small group of 
neurons.  Because neurons within a population are only weakly correlated with one 
another, the contributions of individual neurons to choice are therefore expected to be 
modest (e.g., Shadlen et al., 1996). 
 
4.2 Top-down versus bottom-up 
In this dissertation I presented physiological evidence that in a simple visual 
detection task, the majority of the subject’s choice-related variability is present in 
primary visual cortex, and that it is distributed across several square millimeters, an area 
comprising millions of cells.  What is the source of this co-variation? 
The presence of choice-related neural variability in sensory cortex could be due to 
at least three different mechanisms.  The simplest explanation is that sensory variability 
co-varies with choice because it causes the choice.  This feed-forward (bottom-up) 
mechanism is consistent with the findings of earlier studies in which artificial stimulation 
of task-relevant sensory neurons biased the subject’s performance, or in which lesions in 
areas containing these neurons produced performance deficits, which showed that these 
sensory neurons were necessary to perform the task.  A second possibility is that during a 
task such as ours, which requires the subject to indicate his choice with a saccadic eye 
movement, a higher brain area involved in the planning of eye movements, such as the 
frontal eye fields, may send feedback (top-down) signals to sensory cortex.  These signals 
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are likely to be closely related to the subject’s decision and thus could drive the activity 
of sensory cortex in such a way that it too would co-vary with the decision.  In this post-
decisional case, sensory cortical activity would reflect a decision that had already been 
made.  A third possibility is that pre-decisional top-down signals from higher brain areas 
influence sensory cortical activity.  For instance, an attention-like signal may modify 
sensory cortical activity in an attempt to improve encoding efficiency. 
In Chapter 2, I argued that a post-decisional top-down signal should be evident in 
the time course of the sensory signals.  Because most stimulus-evoked activity reaching 
higher brain areas must first pass through primary visual cortex, it is likely that the target-
evoked responses we observe in V1 are necessary for the subject to perform the task 
better than chance allows.  If a higher brain area computes the decision and only then 
sends decision-related information back to V1, this decision-related activity would 
emerge significantly later than the stimulus-related signals.  Instead, we found that the 
onset and dynamics of the choice-related signals were nearly identical to that of the 
stimulus-evoked response.  This finding could suggest that the choice-related activity we 
measure is not the result of post-decisional top-down signals.  However, we cannot rule 
out the possibility that the similarity between the onset and dynamics of the choice-
related activity and that of the stimulus-evoked activity is the result of a continuous, 
recurrent feedback signal. 
A pre-decisional top-down signal, such as an attention-like signal, is also an 
unlikely explanation for our results.  In principle, an attention-like signal that varies from 
trial to trial could bias the average sensory cortical activity, leading to a bias in the 
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subject’s choices.  To explain our results, such a signal would have to occur with similar 
temporal dynamics to that of the stimulus-evoked response.  However, in a recent study 
designed to test this possibility in V1 in a similar task and under identical population 
recording methods, we observed attention-like changes that occurred earlier than the 
onset of the evoked response (Chen and Seidemann, 2012), also inconsistent with the 
near correspondence of choice-related and stimulus-related signals observed here.  
Furthermore, top-down signals that bias the subject’s behavior, and that arrive in V1 
before stimulus onset, would reduce the subject’s accuracy in the simple detection task 
considered here.  Such signals would add sensory variability that is unrelated to the 
stimulus, and would thus impair the subject’s ability to distinguish between target-present 
and target-absent trials.  Because our subjects are trained for several months on this task 
prior to imaging, it is unlikely that they would employ such a detrimental strategy.  
Finally, a more remote possibility is that a higher brain area sends top-down signals to 
V1, but keeps a record of these signals and removes or cancels them when forming the 
decision.  While it is unclear why the brain would employ such a strategy, such 
variability in V1 would nevertheless manifest itself as choice-unrelated variability in the 
framework presented in Chapter 2.  Thus, while it is possible that pre-decisional top-
down signals are responsible for the results presented here, these considerations suggest 






4.3 Population-based decisions 
In this dissertation I present new evidence that decisions are formed by combining 
information broadly from populations of neurons, rather than by relying on the activity of 
a single neuron or small group of neurons.  In Chapter 1, I outlined an ongoing debate 
regarding the ‘lower envelope principle’, or the notion that decisions are based – in its 
most extreme version – on the activity of only the most sensitive neuron.  The strongest 
empirical evidence for the lower envelope principle came from studies in the sensory 
periphery (e.g., Mountcastle et al., 1972; Talbot et al., 1968) although evidence has also 
been found in sensory areas of the brain (e.g., Newsome et al., 1989).  On the other hand, 
the lower envelope principle has been criticized as being biologically implausible to 
implement:  how does the brain identify the most informative neuron out of millions of 
candidates?  In Chapter 2, I showed that choice-related activity extends broadly across 
V1, offering empirical evidence that the brain pools broadly to form decisions.  In 
Chapter 3, we developed a model of the decision circuit under conditions of uncertainty 
about the stimulus, and our solution to this model also points towards broad pooling. 
While the physiological recordings and computational models I present here 
indeed point towards broad pooling, our results nevertheless offer a richer interpretation 
than a simple rejection of the lower envelope principle.  The model we developed that 
best accounts for our physiological data, the intrinsic uncertainty decoder, is based on the 
idea that the subject has uncertainty about the location of the stimulus he must detect.  
The model solution suggests that the subject searches for a template resembling the 
evoked response, but conducts the search over an area significantly broader than this 
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template, owing to this incomplete knowledge.  Thus while the choice-triggered maps 
presented in Chapter 2 reveal choice-related activity that extends across several 
millimeters of visual cortex, the modeling study of Chapter 3 suggests that, with better 
information about the location of the stimulus, the subject would likely pool over an area 
significantly smaller than this region.  Based on the quantitative solutions to the model, 
these regions could differ by as much as a factor of four. 
The discrepancy between the breadth of the subject’s template and that of the 
uncertainty region over which the subject searches suggests that a subject may attempt to 
base decisions on a smaller number of the most informative neurons, but, because of 
intrinsic uncertainty, the subject is unable to precisely identify those neurons.  This 
finding lends support to the notion that while smaller groups of neurons could in 
principle be used to perform the task accurately, in practice finding those neurons may be 
impossible for a variety of reasons – in this case because of location uncertainty.  
Nevertheless, the model solution for the breadth of the template (1.5 mm, somewhat 
narrower than the evoked response) still represents an area comprising hundreds of 
thousands of neurons.  Thus our data suggests that decisions are likely to be based on 
large populations, but the spatial extent of the neural population showing choice-related 
activity may be exaggerated by intrinsic uncertainty, incomplete knowledge of the task, 






4.4 Intrinsic uncertainty and sub-optimal decoding 
In Chapter 3 I presented evidence that the subject’s performance is significantly 
limited by sub-optimal decoding of sensory signals.  We estimated the impact of sub-
optimal decoding in two steps.  First, we estimated the parameters of the decision model 
and used these parameters to decode simulated sensory population signals, which allowed 
us to quantify the variance of the decoded sensory signals.  We then applied the optimal 
decoder with no spatial uncertainty to the same simulated population to determine the 
variance of the sensory population when decoded under optimal conditions.  The 
difference between these variances represents the quantitative impact of sub-optimal 
decoding, which we expressed as a fraction of the total variance of the decision variable.  
Our result suggests that in our task, sub-optimal decoding can explain approximately 
24% of the total behavioral variance. 
This degree of sub-optimality seems to represent a surprisingly large contribution 
to behavior.  For example, a pair of studies reviewed in Chapter 1 demonstrated that 
neural variability in a cortical decision area was progressively reduced during an 
extended period of training in a motion direction discrimination task, while the variability 
of sensory inputs to this area remained unchanged (Law and Gold, 2008; Law and Gold, 
2009).  This result suggests that intensive training may involve changes not in how 
sensory information is encoded in the brain, but in how that information is decoded into 
signals relevant to a specific task.  In light of their findings, one may think of sensory 
encoding as a fixed process whereby a relatively inflexible early sensory cortex 
represents low-level features of sensory stimuli as generally as possible for subsequent 
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use by downstream circuits.  In comparison, one may think of sensory decoding as a 
more flexible process whereby relatively plastic decision circuits must actively and 
quickly alter the pattern of weights that transforms general low-level information into 
useful signals that are relevant to a specific task.  Under these assumptions, one expects 
that a highly trained subject demonstrating stable task performance for several months, as 
in our experiments, should have discovered over time the pattern of weights that most 
effectively transforms encoded sensory information into signals useful for efficient task 
performance.  In other words, we expect that in highly trained subjects, sensory decoding 
should be highly efficient. 
Here we suggest that the main factor limiting efficient decoding in our task is 
intrinsic spatial uncertainty about the correct target location.  The possibility that subjects 
have intrinsic uncertainty about stimulus features has been proposed previously (e.g., 
Pelli, 1985) and tested psychophysically in a detection task (Michel and Geisler, 2011).  
However, the reason for this limitation is unclear.  One consideration is the degree to 
which the task studied here represents natural behavior.  In our task, we require the 
subject to make repeated judgments about the presence or absence of a stimulus that can 
occur only in a fixed location in visual space.  While it is easy to imagine natural 
scenarios in which an organism must continuously monitor the potential presence of a 
stimulus (such as the image of a prey or a predator) in a fixed location in the world (such 
as behind a patch of leaves or at the top of a nearby tree), the location in question in these 
examples is fixed in world coordinates, rather than in retinal coordinates.  The ability of 
an organism to precisely remember a location in retinal coordinates may be of limited 
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importance under natural conditions.  Thus the demands of the natural environment may 
apply little selection pressure on the evolving brain to perform accurately in the specific 
task our subjects must perform. 
 
4.5 Downstream noise 
An additional form of sub-optimality in the decision process occurs downstream 
from sensory decoding.  Researchers often include a final processing stage that adds 
random variability to the decoded signals.  This additional variability is typically 
modeled as scalar downstream noise, but in practice it may take a number of forms.  
First, downstream noise may arise from the stochastic firing of a population of neurons 
responsible for transforming the decision-related signal into motor commands.  As in the 
case of sensory decoding, the ability of the brain to relay the decision to motor circuits 
likely depends on the pattern of weights that gates the parallel flow of information from 
one brain structure (e.g., early sensory cortex) to another (e.g., motor cortex or sub-
cortical motor structures).  As in sensory decoding, optimizing this pattern of weights to 
the task at hand is expected to reduce the variability introduced by stochastic firing.  
Thus, limitations in the brain’s ability to optimally cancel neural stochasticity through 
pooling of signals at this later stage may contribute to the total variability of the decision 
variable, just as it does during sub-optimal decoding of sensory signals. 
Second, downstream noise may arise from criterial noise, or variability in the 
value of the criterion against which the decision variable is evaluated to form the binary 
decision.  Scalar downstream noise reduces both the subject’s ability to accurately 
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perform the task, as well as the researcher’s ability to accurately predict choice.  This 
random variability occasionally causes the decision variable to exceed the criterion even 
though the decoded sensory response fell below the criterion, and vice versa.  Variability 
in the criterion itself produces the same result. 
Finally, downstream noise may take the form of variability added by the muscles.  
For example, small variations in the contraction of striated muscle in response to signals 
from the decision circuit and upper motor neurons constitute variation in behavior.  Such 
variability is unlikely to play a role in the binary task studied here because the subject’s 
measured behavioral response takes a discrete form:  either a saccadic eye movement to a 
distant location, or no saccadic eye movement.  Thus small random variation in the 
activation of the relevant muscle groups is unlikely to result in a discrepancy between the 
measured behavioral response and the subject’s intended response.  Nevertheless, 
variation in muscle activation may contribute measurably to behavioral variability during 
tasks requiring a continuous, rather than discrete behavioral response. 
 
4.6 Future directions 
The physiological, behavioral, and modeling results presented in this dissertation 
suggest opportunities for future investigation.  In Chapter 2, I presented a novel statistical 
framework for investigating the relationship between neural population activity and 
choice.  I described how this framework could be extended to studies of the relationship 
between neural population activity and choice in other binary decision tasks, such as the 
classic motion direction discrimination (“dots”) task.  An interesting possibility for future 
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research is to explore the relationship between single-neuron measures and population 
measures in the context of this new framework.  While outside the scope of this 
dissertation, which focuses on measuring population activity with VSDI, our framework 
may allow other researchers to better understand how choice-related variability is 
distributed across sensory cortex at a finer scale, such as at the level of individual 
neurons. 
In Chapter 3 I reported a class of population decoding algorithms, the intrinsic 
uncertainty decoders, which can explain key features of our VSDI and behavioral results.  
I presented an example solution to this class of models, which captures three important 
features of the data:  a broader spread of choice-related activity during target-absent trials 
than during target-present trials, a broader spread of saccade endpoints during target-
absent trials than during target-present trials, and stronger cortical activity during False 
Alarm trials than during Miss trials.  An additional feature of the data that was not 
captured by this model is a shift in the mean location of the choice-triggered maps:  
choice-related activity occurs at a more foveal location during target-absent trials than 
during target-present trials; this result qualitatively agrees with our additional observation 
that the endpoints of saccadic eye movements occur more foveally during FA trials than 
during Hit trials.  Furthermore, while the model solution I presented in Chapter 3 is 
statistically consistent with the key features of our data, a fully satisfying model would 
provide values closer to these quantities’ means.  Each of these concerns could be 
addressed by the derivation of a maximum likelihood estimation procedure within a 
Bayesian framework.  A Bayesian estimator will likely enable us to reject certain models 
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and thereby refine our estimate of the monkey’s decoding algorithm.  Thus, a formal 
description of our class of intrinsic uncertainty decoders is an important goal for future 
research. 
 
4.7 Concluding remarks 
In this dissertation, I studied the neural basis of perceptual decisions.  I trained 
monkeys to perform a challenging reaction time visual detection task, and monitored the 
activity of populations of neurons in primary visual cortex while the monkeys performed 
the task.  By comparing neural population activity during trials culminating in each of 
four behavioral outcomes, and developing computational models of the relationship 
between such neural population activity and behavior, I reached several conclusions 
which further our understanding of perceptual decisions.  The results presented here 
suggest that perceptual decisions are mediated by large populations of sensory neurons; 
that in highly trained subjects most of the neural variability relating to perceptual 
decisions resides in early sensory cortex; and that sub-optimality in decoding the sensory 
population represents a significant contribution to inefficiency in task performance.  
Important goals for future research include investigating the relationship between 
population activity and single-neuron activity during binary choice tasks in order to refine 
estimates of the decision algorithm, and carrying out similar work in other species and 
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